AN ADDITIONAL DIALOGUE OF THE DEAD.
AN ADDITIONAL DIALOGUE OF THE DEAD, BETWEEN PERICLES and ARISTIDES: Being a Sequel to the Dialogue between PERICLES and COSMO.
Alteram Partem audi.
LONDON, Printed for L. DAVIS and C. REYMERS, opposite
Gray's-Inn-Gate,
in
Holbourn.
MDCCLX.
Advertisement.
THOUGH the Study of History be instructive and useful; yet, in one Respect, it becomes the Source of frequent Error, even when it is written with Impartiality and Truth. This ariseth from a
mistaken Application
of
historical Facts.
This Error is apt to creep into all Reasonings, on every Subject, where
Men
and
Manners
are concerned; but it is peculiarly apt to infect
political
Reasonings, above all others. As the political Interests of Men make the principal Subject of History, so the political Reasoner hath Recourse to History, as the best Support of his Argument. But, though the Politician is, of all others, the readiest to appeal to History, yet he seems, of all others, most liable to be mistaken in his Application of it to his own Purpose; because the political Connexions and Interests of Men are, above all others,
complicated
and
various.
Hence, as no two political Constitutions were ever
the same
in
all
their Circumstances, though
similar
in
many
; so, all Arguments drawn from a
partial Resemblance
must be
inadequate
and
inconclusive
; unless when it appears, that no other Circumstances took Place, by which that
partial Resemblance
might be
counteracted,
and it's Effects
destroyed.
Yet it hath been a Practice too common among political Reasoners, from a
partial
Resemblance between two States, to infer a
total
one; and, because they have been
like
in
some
Respects, to draw Conclusions, as if they had been
like
in
all.
Here, then, appears a Source of perpetual Error.
Among all the political Questions that can be debated in a free Country, there is none of greater Importance, than that which regards the
Character
and
Influence
of the
Body of a People.
Nothing hath been more usual among political Reasoners, than to represent the
Body
of
every People,
as the ready
Tools
of
Demagogues
and
Faction:
And since the endless Factions of the
Athenian Republic
have been so often alledged, as unanswerable Proofs of this; the intelligent Reader will easily discern, that the Tendency of the following Dialogue is, to fix this Argument to it's
proper Limits,
and prevent a too
general Application
of a
particular Fact.
AN ADDITIONAL DIALOGUE OF THE DEAD.
PERICLES and ARISTIDES:
I AM glad to have found you, PERICLES: Since your Conversation with COSMO, (which, you know, I overheard) I have been revolving the Subject of it in my Mind; and begin to think, you left the Matter short.
Your Sentiments on this Subject will give me Pleasure. Tell me, ARISTIDES; in what Respect do you esteem the conclusion of our Argument to have been defective?
With Regard to yourself, I think your Conclusions were just: I grant you,
that by weakening the Power of the Court of the AREOPAGUS, you tore up that Anchor, which SOLON had fixed, to keep his Republic stedfast and firm, against the Storms of popular Faction.
On this Account, I farther must allow, that
notwithstanding the Integrity which you preserved in your public Conduct, and the great Virtues which you exerted, your Place in
Elysium
is justly below that of those, who have governed Republics, or
limited Monarchies,
not merely with a Concern for their present Advantage; but with a prudent Regard to that
Balance
of
Power,
on which their
permanent Happiness
always depends.
If you allow me this, it is all I contend for. What could remain farther to be adjusted in the Debate?
I am of Opinion, that the Question was decided in too general a Manner: And that for Want of a little more Particularity of Argument and Proof, Conclusions might be
plausibly
drawn, which would be very distant from the Truth.
Pray, explain yourself a little farther, ARISTIDES; for as yet I do not clearly comprehend you.
What I mean is this: That Free States, or
limited Monarchies,
though they may greatly resemble each other in their
external Construction,
may yet be so very unlike in their
internal Condition,
that no just Conclusions could be drawn concerning their Prosperity and Welfare, merely from their
external Resemblance.
Thus we will suppose two States to be equally
free,
in their legal Constitution: But let us farther suppose, that the
Manners
or
Principles,
which prevail in these two States are widely different; and, in that Case, I apprehend, that if you regard only the legal
Form
of the Constitution, without weighing the
Manners
and
Principles
of the Members of the State, you will be in great Danger of imposing
false Conclusions
on yourself and others.
I did not force any of these Conclusions upon you. They are of your own making.
It is true, you did not force them upon me: Yet they are not of my own making. For some of the
Shades,
who overheard your Conversation, have since told me, that the general Turn of your Discourse
obliquely led
to these Conclusions; and therefore thought that it would become ARISTIDES to discuss this Point with a little more Precision.
I am ready to hear any thing you have to say on this interesting Subject.
You will give me leave then, to examine some things that passed in your Discourse with COSMO.
Pray be as free with them as you please. I rely on the Candor as well as Justice of ARISTIDES.
I will endeavour to deserve your favourable Opinion. You may remember, you said
That by weakening the Power of the Court of AREOPAGUS, you tore up that Anchor, which SOLON had fixed, to keep his Republic stedfast and firm, against the Storms of popular Factions.
This, I think, was the first Foundation of your Argument.
It was.
Is it a safe Practice, PERICLES, to build an Argument on a Metaphor?
I should think it is; provided the Metaphor contain a just Image of the Fact in Question.
That I allow: but still the Question remains, whether the Metaphor contain that just Image or not. So that we are not yet advanced a Step towards the Discovery of Truth.
At least it is an Illustration.
Then, I think it had better have come after the Discovery. I believe I can give you another Metaphor which shall lead directly to the contrary Conclusion. 'Tis a wise Practice, you say, to keep fixed the
Anchor.
In general, I grant you, it is so. Yet you know, that in Times of Tempest and Distress, the most experienced Admiral, when anchored near a rocky Shore, is forced to
slip his Cables,
and commit his Fleet to the
wide Sea,
till he can
anchor
on a
safer Bottom.
That is a dangerous Practice.
True: and therefore never to be tryed, except in a Time of extreme Danger.
Well: I will grant you that a Metaphor proves nothing.
That is the only Purpose for which I intended mine. We will proceed, therefore, with our Argument. And the sum of what I have to say, will only tend to the Proof of this single Point;
That a
free State,
or
limited Monarchy,
resembling that of
Athens
in it's external Form, may yet be so differently circumstanced in it's
internal Condition,
that a Conduct in many Respects similar to Yours, shall be the only means of
saving
that State from Ruin, though Your well meant Conduct led the State of
Athens
to it's
Destruction.
It seems to me, ARISTIDES, that you undertake a Task of no small Difficulty. Proceed: I am all Attention.
Pray tell me, PERICLES: Was the Court of the AREOPAGUS
wise, courageous, uncorrupt,
and bent upon the public Service in Opposition to all self-interested Views, when You set about to lessen it's Authority?
To my Confusion, I must confess it was. For in Fact;
The annual
Magistrates,
the
Guardians
of the
Laws,
the
Governors
of the sacred
Rites,
and
Chieftains
in
War,
were all
chosen
by
Lot:
and they who had acquitted themselves
well
in the Discharge of these
Trusts,
were advanced, and taken into the Court of the AREOPAGUS
Plutarch, in his Life of Pericles.
.
You are right in your Idea of this
wise
and
disinterested
Court. Tell me farther now. Was the Body of the Athenian People
sensible, honest,
and
united,
when you threw yourself into their Arms, and increased their Power?
I cannot say much, either for their
Good Sense,
their
Uprightness,
or their
Union
; on the Contrary, I fear they were
ignorant, self-interested
and
disunited.
Nay, I must farther confess, that I myself was the Cause and Promoter of their Vices and Factious Temper. For I not only gained and ruled them by my
Eloquence,
as I confessed in my Conversation with COSMO; but
by giving them the Plunder and Possession of the Lands taken from the Enemy, and by squandering the public Monies (formerly reserved for the Uses of War) in Shows and Plays for their Entertainment, and by giving them
Largesses
or
Pensions,
I brought them from a sober, modest, and thrifty People, who maintained themselves by their own Labours, to become riotous and debauched through these mistaken Methods of Policy: Thus it was that I turned them against the Court of the AREOPAGUS
Plutarch, in his Life of Pericles.
.
It gives me Pleasure to find you so much more full and explicit in this Affair, than you were in your Discourse with COSMO. — So then, you took Power from a Body of Men,
wise, disinterested,
and
uncorrupt,
to put it into the hands of Men
ignorant, self-interested,
and
factious.
Too true: I did:
Because I knew that my Eloquence would (with these other Methods, still
more powerful
) subject the People to me, and make them the Instruments of all my Desires: whereas the AREOPAGUS had an Authority and a Dignity in it which I could not controul.
So you said in your Discourse with COSMO. Let us now reverse these Facts, and suppose the Court of the AREOPAGUS had deserted the Principles of their first Institution: That either
Luxury,
the Love of
Gain,
or a Spirit of false
Ambition,
had crept in among them; and rendered them either
incapable,
and
corrupt:
And farther let us suppose, that the Body of the People had been
sensible, honest,
and
united:
What had been the Consequence?
The Case indeed had been altogether
different.
I would give all the Wreaths I ever was honoured with, to have built my Conduct on so noble a Foundation.
I commend your Wisdom, though it comes too late. The Case indeed had been not only altogether
different,
but altogether
contrary.
Instead of
destroying
the Commonwealth, you had
restored
the tottering Fabrick. You had then taken Power from
Folly
and
Corruption,
to bestow it on
Sense
and
Integrity.
And, depend upon it, in whatever Body of Men
Sense
and
Integrity
are found,
these are the Anchors of the State.
Your Maxim looks plausible: Yet still I cannot but regard it as a dangerous Practice, to make a
Breach
in the established Constitution of a free State.
So do I. And I think your Principle is so far from
overturning,
that it
confirms,
my Argument.
That appears to me a strange Paradox.
Tell me, PERICLES: Is not a
Breach
made in the political Constitution of a free State, when it's wholesome Laws and Institutions have lost their
Power
and
Efficacy?
Certainly.
And can they so entirely lose their Power and Efficacy, in any other Way, as by the
Incapacity
and
Corruption
of those who
govern?
I allow, they cannot.
Then you see, that upon Supposition that the Court of the AREOPAGUS had lost their
Ability
or
public Virtue,
'tis they who first deprive the Laws of their
Power
and
Efficacy,
and consequently, 'tis they who make the
Breach
in the established Constitution.
This seems to be true: But still, why should the People follow their Example, and, by insisting on
extraordinary Powers
and
Privileges,
make a
second Breach
in the Constitution?
O PERICLES, you view the Question with a partial Eye: What you call a
second Breach
in the Constitution is indeed no more than the natural Effort of the
sound Parts
of the Body politic, to
throw off
the
morbific Matter
by which it is oppressed. Thus in the natural Body, all Diseases come to their Crisis, and a Cure is effected by the Vigour and Activity of the uninfected Parts. Whereever then the Disease lies, either in the Body politic, or the Body natural, the sound Parts must check and throw off that which is infected, or Death ensues. — Thus, you see, supposing the
People
to be
sensible
and
honest,
and the Court of AREOPAGUS
corrupted
or
incapable,
the only Means of saving the State is the Power which the People have to
check
and
reform
the Court of the AREOPAGUS.
But is not this
unhinging
the Constitution?
So far from it, that it is the only Way of
fixing
it; by bringing it back to it's first Principles. — How did this famed Constitution first arise? Was it not by the united Consent of the several Ranks of the Community, each of which had their several Privileges and Powers appropriated, on Condition of applying them to the public Good? The Court of the AREOPAGUS violates it's Engagements: The Voice of an honest and abused People rouzes them from their fatal Dream: What is the natural Consequence? Why, surely, the Reformation of the Court of the AREOPAGUS. An
honest
and
sensible
People never desires more than
Redress
of Grievances; and, when that is obtained, return
chearfully
to
Subordination,
and
adore
their
Rulers.
This is at best an
unstable
and
fluctuating
State of Things.
Every political State must be, in some Degree,
fluctuating
and
unstable,
unless you load it with the Chains of
Despotism.
But I maintain, that the
best Security,
nay the
only
one to a
Free
Government, lies in the upright
Manners
and
Principles
of it's constituent Members; and that, whenever there is any Deviation from these, the only Possibility of a Restoration lies in the
Prevalence
of the
sound
and
virtuous
Part over that which is
corrupted,
in
whatever Part
of the
Community
the
Infection
may lie; whether it be the Court of the AREOPAGUS, or the Body of the
People.
For, as it was truly observed in your Discourse with COSMO,
Force
or
Caprice
may give
(immediate
and
temporary)
Power; but nothing can give a
lusting Authority,
except
Wisdom
and
Virtue
Dialogues of the Dead, p. 242.
.
But is not this a dangerous Principle to instill into the Body of the People, that they have a Right to controul the Errors of the Court of AREOPAGUS? Does it not lead to Sedition and Anarchy? And was not this the Consequence of my mistaken Conduct?
You are now puzzling the Question again by making it
general.
I reply then, that in your particular Case, the Practice was
dangerous
and
fatal
; because the Court of the AREOPAGUS was
capable
and
honest,
the People of
Athens
were
incapable, self-interested,
and
factious.
You therefore
tore
up the
Anchor
of the State. But suppose the Court of the AREOPAGUS to have been
incapable,
and
venal,
and you have seen that the
Security
of the Republic was already lost: You have seen (to use your own Metaphor, in the Way of Illustration) that the
Anchor
of the
State
was
already torn up
; and the only
Bottom,
on which it could be again safely
cast,
was the
rational Influence
of a
sensible
and
honest People.
But supposing I had not
corrupted
the
Integrity
of the
Athenian
People; do you think they could have remained secure against the Influence of
indiscreet or venal Orators, who, encouraged by my Example, might have misled their
honest Intentions,
and rowzed them into Sedition against an uncorrupted Court of the AREOPAGUS?
Tell me, PERICLES; what was the
Number
of the
People
of
Athens?
I cannot be precise in this: But I know, that the Number of those, whose Favour and Influence I courted, did not exceed that of a
large Audience:
I have often harangued them in one
collective Body.
What was their
Rank,
and what their
Employments
in Life?
They were composed, as you know very well, of
Labourers
and
Mechanics.
All who were able to
keep
a
Horse,
were admitted into the se
ond Order of the
Magistracy
Plutarch, in the Life of Solon.
. And therefore the Body of the People, whose Influence I courted, was composed of such as were
not able
to
keep
a
Horse.
What was their
Capacity?
You will not expect much of
That.
It was suited to their
Station.
Your Account is just: And therefore I confess, PERICLES, that, in my Opinion, they never could be secure against the
Seduction
of indiscreet and venal
Orators.
Their
small Number,
their
continual Necessities,
their
general Ignorance,
must for ever expose them to the Delusions of a
powerful Rhetoric.
Then, I think, my Consequence stands good: "That the united Voice even of an honest People can be no Ground of Security to a State.
I grant you, it is not, where the People are such, in
Number, Station,
and
Incapacity,
as, in
your Time,
the
Athenian
People were. But take Heed, lest you make your Inference too general. The only just Consequence that can be drawn is this, that a Republic so circumstanced is absolutely
void
of
all Security:
For you see, that in Case the Court of the AREOPAGUS was
delinquent,
the People were not of sufficient Capacity or Weight to
restore
the
Balance
of the State. On the other Hand, supposing that Court to be
uncorrupt,
you see that the People were liable to be
seduced
to it's Destruction. Such a Republic, therefore, was formed for continual
Factions
while it lasted, and then for a
speedy Death.
Do you think, ARISTIDES, that, by a
Change
of
Circumstances,
these Evils could admit of any Remedy?
I think they might. — In your Discourse with COSMO, you hinted at a
limited Monarchy.
I will therefore leave this
imperfect Form,
this
Embryo
of a Commonwealth, to speak of a more august Image of a Government. Suppose therefore, that the
Athenian
State, instead of a petty Province, had been a large, populous, and fertile Country, governed by a
King,
and two Courts, vested with higher Powers than that of the AREOPAGUS
The Court of the AREOPAGUS was
judicial,
not
legislative.
; that one of them had been
hereditary,
the other
chosen
by the Body of the
People
; and that the
Legislative
Power was lodged in the
united Suffrages
of these three —
You charm me, by the very Supposition. — What a glorious Republic! —
Do not you see, PERICLES, that all I have said concerning the State of ATHENS, would gain new Strength, under such a Supposition?
My Views must be narrow indeed, if I could not see some Differences arise: pray go on.
In the first Place, what could shake such a Kingdom as this, if all the several Powers maintained the
Purity
and
Vigour
of their Institution?
Methinks I see the Picture of an eternal Government.
But suppose that, by the Excess of Commerce, and an Overflow of Wealth, or by any other Cause, a pernicious
Luxury
shou'ld creep in, and steal unperceived on the
higher Ranks:
Suppose farther, that the very
Genius
of the
Constitution,
formed for the noblest Ends, should yet have a natural
Tendency
towards political
Venality
and
Corruption,
unless strongly guarded by a
Purity
of
Principle
and
Manners
; and suppose this political
Venality
should, in Fact, creep in along with
Luxury
; what Consequences would you expect?
You terrify me by the Representation: I behold the State on the Brink of
Ruin.
Instead of
Ability, Courage,
and
Public Spirit,
among the
leading Ranks
; I see them immersed in every fatal
Indulgence.
I see their Councils
divided,
their Fleets and Armies
disgraced,
and some neighbouring PHILIP in Possession of their
Forts
and
Colonies.
Where would you seek for the
Cure
of these enormous Evils?
Certainly no
Cure
can take Place, till
Ability, Courage,
and
Public Spirit
should arise on the Ruins of their
Contraries.
Your Aim is good. But the grand Question is, by what
Means
this can be effected.
I fear, the
Means
must be
violent.
I have heard you talk of a
coercive Power,
sufficient to
reform Corruption.
Where, do you think, this might most probably be found?
I am casting about; but I cannot find it. My Experience makes me afraid of the Interposition of the People —
What? even though they were
honest
and
sensible?
Why should you fear the Influence of a
general good Sense
and
Integrity?
I cannot conceive it probable, that the
lower
Ranks should be more
sensible
or more
upright,
than their
Superiors
in Station.
I can suppse, nay I do suppose, that many of the
higher
Ranks are
sensible, upright,
and
worthy,
in several Respects: That they have many
private Virtues:
That
Justice
and
Humanity
are their
allowed Qualities:
That their chief Defect lies in their Want of
Public Virtue,
in their
Neglect
of the
Public Happiness.
What Probability could there be, then, that the
People
should
attend
to
this,
when it was neglected by their
Leaders?
Tell me, PERICLES: When there are honest Inclinations in the Soul, whence can any Obstructions arise to their due Exertion?
Why, sure, from some
contrary Inclinations,
which may
tempt
the Mind from it's
natural Integrity.
You are right. So then, if in a State thus circumstanced, the Body of the
People
should be more steady than their
Leaders
in their Zeal for the
public Welfare
; this must be, because they are not liable to the same
Temptations,
which might expose them to a like Neglect of the
general Happiness.
What you say, seems probable.
Cannot you discern certain Circumstances, which would naturally arise, and prove strong
Temptations
to the
Great,
while the Body of the
People
might, for a Time at least,
escape
them?
Let me weigh the Matter. — Yes, indeed; from what you said before, I think I can. — You supposed, as I remember, that Luxury had crept in —
Go on: I see, you comprehend the Argument.
I perceive, the natural Consequence of this must be, that the higher Ranks would be first infected with it; and therefore must be exposed to Temptations, which the Body of the People would escape:
One Temptation
must naturally arise from that
unmanly
or
effeminate
Character, which a refined Luxury tends to introduce:
Another,
from an intemperate Desire of
supplying Expences,
now grown
exorbitant.
You say true: But can you point out no farther Temptations, to which the leading Ranks would be naturally exposed, beyond the Body of the People?
These are what offered themselves to my Thoughts. Do you see any more?
Many, and strong ones.—In a Kingdom thus circumstanced, extensive, fertile, mercantile, rich, and populous, a countless Number of
lucrative Offices
must arise, and be established, for the
Protection
and
good Order
of the State.
I grant it.
What Part of the Community, do you think, would lay Claim to these? The
superior
Ranks, or the
inferior?
Doubtless, the
Superior:
Their Education, Rank, Wealth, and Influence, would naturally lead them to expect a Preference.
And if you farther suppose, that Luxury and Expence prevailed, these Posts would be more eagerly sought for, in Proportion as they were
more lucrative.
True: The Profit, I fear, would often be a leading Motive.
The higher Ranks, then, would be naturally assiduous to recommend themselves to those, who had the
Disposal
of these profitable Employments: while the Body of the People, because generally
excluded
from all
Hope
of being raised to them, would be
more independent
of those in Power.
I must needs grant it.
See you no Consequences arise?
You have convinced me, ARISTIDES: I see, that the
higher
Ranks in such a State, though equally possessed of
private
Virtues, must be much more exposed to the Temptations of
political Venality
and
Corruption,
than the Body of the
People.
That is the Truth to which I meant to lead you.
Yet still I fear the Effects of popular Power; because, by Experience, I know
the Influence of indiscreet and venal
Orators,
over the Passions of a misguided, infatuated Multitude, who thought their Freedom consisted in encouraging Calumnies against the best Servants of the Republic; and conferring Power on those, who had no other Merit, than falling in with, and soothing, a popular Folly
Dialogues of the Dead, p. 255.
.
This Objection, as I said before, may be of Weight in a
small Republic,
such as that of
Athens
was in Your Days or Mine. But supposing it to have been augmented into a
great, populous, civilized,
and
powerful,
Kingdom, such as I have now represented, which contains more
Square Leagues
than
Attica
contains
Acres,
more
Cities
than
Attica
contains
Villages,
more
Men
of
Fortune
than
Attica
contains
Mechanics,
and the Objection vanishes into nothing. I can easily see, how a busy Orator may mount the Rostrum, and intoxicate an ignorant Multitude that surrounds him; and this, PERICLES, I fear was
your
Imprudence, nay, perhaps,
my own.
In a small State, like that of
Athens,
such an Event as this must affect the public Welfare: But, in a Kingdom so
inlarged,
and so
inlightened,
as that which I have supposed, the Harangues of an Orator, to any surrounding Audience of the People, can no more affect the
general Welfare,
than the buzzing of an eloquent
Bee
can affect a
Province,
when he leads out the murmuring
Hive
on the Mountains of
Hybla
or
Hymettus.
Do you think the Difference so great?
I do: Because, in a City like that of
Athens,
the whole Multitude of the Community is easily
collected
in
one
Body; and therefore may be suddenly seduced, by an Orator, into
one
ill Purpose: But, in a great and populous Kingdom, the whole Multitude of the Community cannot be collected into
one
Body; nay, nor into a
hundred
Bodies; and therefore cannot be suddenly seduced, by an Orator, into
one
ill Purpose.
I grant you, the Difference is, in this Respect,
essential.
There is another Respect, in which the Difference is no less essential and important. You have confessed, PERICLES, that the People, or Multitude, which you seduced, were
a Rabble of Labourers and Mechanics, who had been accustomed to earn their Bread by the Sweat of their Brows.
See above, and Plutarch, in his Life of Pericles.
But, if
Attica
had been enlarged into so vast a Kingdom as I have here supposed, the Body of the People would have been of a Character far
superior.
For, besides those of the highest Rank and Fortune, who would naturally form the two Courts of the AREOPAGUS, and aspire to the leading Offices in the Commonwealth; besides these, I say, there would be an innumerable Number of
landed Commoners,
the general Body of the
Priesthood,
the
rich Merchants,
and
wealthy Plebeians
of inferior Rank, all
independent
of the Governing Powers, many of them of excellent
Ability,
as well as
Probity
; most of them of Leisure and Education sufficient to enable them to judge of the
leading Lines
or
Features
of an upright Government; especially in the great Article of
Protection
from foreign or domestic
Injuries.
And can you think it possible, that the
good Sense
and
Honesty
of all these should be seduced into their own Destruction, by a designing or venal Orator?
I must confess, it is utterly incredible.
Still farther. As it would be thus impossible to
seduce
by
Eloquence,
so it would be no less impracticable to
corrupt,
by
Bribes,
this
whole Body
of Men, to the Desertion of their own true Interest. A few, nay indeed a Number, might be thus corrupted; but this would never produce an
united Voice
; for the remaining Part, and that much the
largest,
would loudly
clamour
; and thus, nothing but
Discord
could arise. To silence so many Millions, by repeated Bribes, would require ten Times the Wealth of CROESUS; and more than ever Man, nay, more than ever Nation, possessed.
You have Reason in what you say: I perceive now, that nothing but a fair and open Prosecution of the
general Interest
could ever unite so great a People.
I am of your Opinion. And thus you see, that as the
small, ignorant,
and
needy
Body of the
Athenian
People, in such a State as You and I beheld it, is the easiest of all to be seduced by Eloquence, or gained by Bribes; so, upon it's being aggrandized into such a
vast, knowing,
and
wealthy
Body, as I have here supposed, it would, above all others, have been secure against the Attacks either of
Eloquence
or
Corruption.
I perceive, I have been confounding two Things together, as being altogether
similar,
when, in Reality, their Qualities are altogether
opposite
; and this, merely because they are called by the
same Appellation,
the
Body of the People.
At length, you see the Foundation of your Error.
I confess, ARISTIDES, that in my Discourse with COSMO, these distinguishing Particularities were not sufficiently attended to. I drew Inferences, and extended Consequences, to all free States, without Exception, which could only be justly applyed to a small Republic, circumstanced like that of
Athens.
You see then, PERICLES, that if
Athens
had been a great, rich, literate, and powerful Republic, under the Appearance and Name of a
limited Monarchy,
you could have had no Chance for seducing the whole collective Body of the People, either by Bribes or Eloquence.
I allow it.
You see farther, that in Case of any Delinquency in the Courts of the AREOPAGUS, if you had exerted your Talents in Support of the
general Welfare,
this
great
and
grateful
People, with one united Voice, would have
adopted
and
adored
you: Yet only so long as you had made that general Welfare the undoubted Object of your Labours.
It seems probable.
You see then, that by building your Power on so firm a Foundation, you would have been enabled to dispense
Rewards
and
Punishments
with Justice and Vigour; that you could have
displaced
the
incapable
and
unworthy,
and put into
Action
those who were
most fit
to discharge the several Offices of the Commonwealth; that you could,
by Degrees,
have checked the Venality and Incapacity of the various Ranks, and thus have given the proper
Elasticity
and
Tone
to the several Parts of the Body politic.
All this I think possible to have been done.
But in doing all this, you would have been so far from
unhinging
Government, that you would have
new-hinged
it when it was
falling
; so far from
destroying
the
Balance
of
Power,
that you would have
renewed
it when it had been
destroyed
; so far from acting with a View to
present Advantage
only, that you would have secured the
future Welfare
of the State; so far from consulting a mere
temporary Felicity,
that you would have fixed it on a Principle of
permanent Happiness.
I cannot deny it.
Haste then, PERICLES: And, lest Mistakes should grow inveterate by Time, inform COSMO of all that hath passed between us.
FINIS.
Lately published by
L. DAVIS
and
C. REYMERS.
ESSAYS on the CHARACTERISTICS of the Earl of Shaftsbury.
The Fourth Edition.
An ESTIMATE of the Manners and Principles of the Times. 2 Vol.
Seventh Edition.