THE STATE of the WAR, AND THE NECESSITY OF AN Augmentation.
THE PRESENT STATE OF THE WAR, AND THE NECESSITY OF AN Augmentation, CONSIDER'D.
LONDON:
Printed, and sold by
J. Morphew
near
Stationers Hall.
1708.
PREFACE.
THE Author of the following Essay has endeavoured to draw into one continued Scheme the whole State of the present War, and the Methods that appear to him the most proper for bringing it to a happy Conclusion.
After having considered that the
French
are the constant and most dangerous Enemies to the
British
Nation, and that the Danger from them is now greater than ever, and will still increase till their present Ʋ nion with
Spain
be broken, he sets forth the several Advantages which this Ʋ nion has already given
France,
and taken from
Great Britain,
in relation to the
West-Indies,
the Wollen Manufacture, the Trade of the
Levant,
and the Naval Power of the Two Nations.
He shews how these Advantages will still rise higher after a Peace, notwithstanding our present Conquests, with new Additions, shou'd be confirmed to us; as well because the Monarchy of
Spain
wou'd not be weakened by such Concessions, as because no Guarantee cou'd be found sufficient to secure them to us. For which Reasons he lays it down as a fixt Rule, That no Peace is to be made without an entire Disunion of the
French
and
Spanish
Monarchies.
That this may be brought about he endeavours to prove from the Progress we have already made towards it, and the Successes we have purchased in the present War, which are very considerable if well pursued, but of no effect if we acquiesce in them.
In order to compleat this Disunion in which we have gone so far, he wou'd not have us relie upon exhausting the
French
Treasury, attempts on the
Spanish Indies,
Descents on
France,
but chiefly upon out-numbring them in Troops,
France
being already drained of her best Supplies, and the Confederates Masters of much greater Forces for Multitude and Strength, both in Men and Horse, and provided with Generals of greater Fame and Abilities.
He then considers the wrong Measures we have hitherto taken in making too small Levies after a successful Campaign, in Regulating their number by that of the Enemys Forces, and Hiring them of our Confederates; shewing at the same time the Inconveniencies we suffer from such hir'd Troops, and several Advantages we might receive from Employing those of our own Nation.
He further
this Augmentation of our Forces, to
the keeping up a Standing Body of
times of Peace, to enable us to make an Impression on the Enemy in the present Posture of the War, and to secure our selves against a Prince, who is now at the Head of a powerful Army, and has not yet declared himself.
In the last place, he answers by several Considerations those two Popular Objections, That we furnish more towards the War than the rest of the Allies, and that we are not able to contribute more than we do already.
These are the most material Heads of the following Essay, in which there are many other subordinate Reflections that naturally grow out of so copious a Subject.
THE PRESENT STATE OF THE WAR, AND THE NECESSITY OF AN Augmentation CONSIDER'D.
THE
French
are certainly the most implacable, and the most dangerous Enemys of the
British
Nation. Their Form of Government, their Religion, their Jealousy of the
British
Power, as well as their Prosecutions of Commerce, and Pursuits of Universal Monarchy, will fix them for ever in their Animosities and Aversions towards us, and make them catch at all Opportunities of subverting our Constitution, destroying our Religion, ruining our Trade, and sinking the Figure which we make among the Nations of
Europe:
Not to mention the particular Ties of Honour that lie on their present King to impose on us a Prince, who must prove fatal to our Country if he ever reigns over us.
As we are thus in a natural State of War, if I may so call it, with the
French
Nation; it is our Misfortune, that they are not only the most inveterate, but most formidable of our Enemies; and have the greatest Power, as well as the strongest Inclination to ruin us. No other State equals them in the Force of their Fleets and Armies, in the Nearness and Conveniency of their Situation, and in the Number of Friends and Wellwishers, which, it is to be fear'd, they have among us.
For these Reasons our Wars with
France
have always affected us in our most tender Interests, and concern'd us more than those we have had with any other Nation; but I may venture to say, This Kingdom was never yet engag'd in a War of so great consequence, as that which now lies upon our hands. Our All is at stake, and irretrievably lost, if we fail of Success. At other times, if a War ended in a dishonourable Peace, or with equal Loss, we cou'd comfort our selves with the hopes of a more favourable Juncture, that might set the Ballance right, or turn it to our Advantage. We had still the prospect of forming the same Alliance, or perhaps strengthning it with new Confederacies, and by that means of trying our Fortune a second time, in case the Injustice or Ambition of the Enemy forc'd us into the Field. At present, if we make a Drawn Game of it, or procure but Moderate advantages, we are in a Condition which every
British
Heart must tremble at the thought of. There are no second Trials, no Wars in reserve, no new Schemes of Alliance to which we can have recourse. Should the
French
King be able to bear down such an united Force as now makes head against him, at a time when
Spain
affords him no greater Assistance; what will he do when the Trade of the
Levant
lies at his Mercy; when the whole Kingdom of
Spain
is supply'd with his Manufactures, and the Wealth of the
Indies
flows into his Coffers; and what is yet worse, when this additional Strength must arise in all its particulars from a proportionable Decay in the States that now make War upon him? It is no wonder therefore that our late King of Glorious Memory, who by the Confession of his greatest Enemies, was a Prince that perfectly understood the Interests of
Europe,
should in his last Speech recommend to his Parliament the declaring War against
France
in those memorable Words:
You have yet an Opportunity, by God's blessing, to secure to you and your Posterity the quiet Enjoyment of your Religion and Liberties, if you are not wanting to your selves, but will exert the antient Vigour of the
English
Nation: but I tell you plainly, my Opinion is, if you do not lay hold on this occasion, you have no reason to hope for another.
We have already a dreadful Proof of the Increase of Power that accrues to
France
from its Conjunction with
Spain.
So expensive a War as that which the
French
Monarchy hath been carrying on in so many and so remote Parts at once, must long since have drain'd and exhausted all its Substance, had there not been several secret Springs, that swell'd their Treasury from time to time, in proportion as the War has sunk it. The King's Coffers have been often reduced to the lowest Ebb, but have still been seasonably refresh'd by frequent and unexpected Supplies from the
Spanish America.
We hear indeed of the Arrival but of very few Ships from those Parts; but as in every Vessel there is Stowage for immense Treasures, when the Cargo is pure Bullion, or Merchandize of as great a Value; so we find by Experience they have had such prodigious Sums of Money convey'd to them by these secret Channels, that they have been enabled to pay more numerous Armies, than they ever had on foot before; and that at a time when their Trade fails in all its other Branches, and is distress'd by all the Arts and Contrivances of their neighbouring Nations. During the last four Years, by a modest Computation there have been brought into
Brest
above six Millions of Pounds Sterling in Bullion. What then shall we suppose wou'd be the effect of this Correspondence with
America,
might the Wealth of those Parts come to them on Squadrons of Men of War, and Fleets of Galeons? If these little Bycurrents, that creep into the Country by Stealth, have so great a Force, how shall we stem the whole Torrent, when it breaks in upon us with its full Violence? And this certainly will be our Case, unless we find a Means to dissolve the Union between
France
and
Spain.
I have dwelt the longer on this Consideration, because the present War hath already furnish'd us with the Experiment, and sensibly convinc'd us of the Increase of Power, which
France
has receiv'd from its Intercourse with the
Spanish West-Indies.
As there are many who look upon every thing which they don't actually see and feel as bare Probability and Speculation, I shall only touch on those other Reasons of which we have already also had some Experience, for our preventing this Coalition of Interests and Designs in the two Monarchies.
The Woollen Manufacture is the
British
Strength, the staple Commodity and proper Growth of our Country; if this fails us, our Trade and Estates must sink together, and all the Cash of the Nation be consumed on Foreign Merchandize. The
French
at present gain very much upon us in this great Article of our Trade, and since the Accession of the
Spanish
Monarchy, supply with Cloath of their own making the very best Mart we had in
Europe.
And what a melancholy Prospect have we, if ever a Peace gives them leave to enrich their Manufacture with Mixtures of
Spanish
Wool to multiply the Hands employ'd in it, to improve themselves in all the Niceties of the Art, and to vend their Wares in those Places where was the greatest Consumption of our Woollen Works, and the most considerable Gain for the
British
Merchant. Notwithstanding our many seasonable Recruits from
Portugal,
and our Plantations, we already complain of our want of Bullion; and must at last be reduc'd to the greatest Exigencies, if this great Source be dry'd up, and our Traffick with
Spain
continue under its present Discouragement.
The Trade of the
Levant
must likewise flourish or decay in our Hands, as we are Friends or Enemies of the
Spanish
Monarchy. The late Conquest of
Naples
will very little alter the case, though
Sicily
should follow the Fate of her Sister Kingdom. The
Streight
's Mouth is the Key of the
Levant,
and will be always in the Possession of those who are Kings of
Spain.
We may only add, that the same Causes which streighten the
British
Commerce, will naturally enlarge the
French;
and that the Naval Force of either Nation will thrive or languish in the same degree as their Commerce gathers or loses Strength. And if so powerful and populous a Nation as that of
France
become superior to us by Sea, our whole is lost, and we are no more a People. The Consideration of so narrow a Channel betwixt us, of such Numbers of regular Troops on the Enemy's side, of so small a standing Force on our own, and that too in a Country destitute of all such Forts and strong Places as might stop the Progress of a victorious Army, hath something in it so terrifying, that one does not care for setting it in its proper Light. Let it not therefore enter into the Heart of any one that hath the least Zeal for his Religion, or Love of Liberty, that hath any regard either to the Honour or Safety of his Country, or a well Wish for his Friends or Posterity, to think of a Peace with
France,
till the
Spanish
Monarchy be entirely torn from it, and the House of
Bourbon
disabled from ever giving the Law to
Europe.
Let us suppose that the
French
King would grant us the most advantageous Terms we can desire; without the Separation of the two Monarchies they must infallibly end in our Destruction. Shou'd he secure to us all our present Acquisitions; shou'd he add two or three Frontier-Towns to what we have already in
Flanders;
shou'd he join the Kingdoms of
Sicily
and
Sardinia
to
Milan
and
Naples;
shou'd he leave King
Charles
in the peaceable Possession of
Catalonia;
shou'd he make over to
Great Britain
the Town and Harbour of
Cadis,
as well as that of
Gibraltar,
and at the same time resign his Conquests in
Portugal;
it wou'd all be of no effect towards the common Safety of
Europe,
while the Bulk of the
Spanish
Continent, and the Riches of
America
remain in the Possession of the
Bourbon
Family.
Boccalini
when he weighs the States of
Europe
in his Political Balance, after having laid
France
in one Scale, throws
Spain
into the other, which wanted but very little of being a Counter-poise. The
Spaniards
upon this, says he, begun to promise themselves the Honour of the Ballance; reckoning that if
Spain
of it self weigh'd so well, they cou'd not fail of Success when the several Parts of the Monarchy were lump'd in the same Scale. Their Surprise was very great when upon the throwing in of
Naples
they saw the Scale rise, and was greater still when they found that
Milan
and
Flanders
had the same effect. The truth of it is, these parts of the
Spanish
Monarchy are rather for Ornament than Strength. They furnish out Vice-royalties for the Grandees, and Posts of Honour for the Noble Families; but in a time of War are Incumbrances to the main Body of the Kingdom, and leave it naked and expos'd by the great number of Hands they draw from it to their Defence. Shou'd we therefore continue in the Possession of what we have already made our selves Masters, with such Additions as have been mentioned, we shou'd have little more than the Excrescencies of the
Spanish
Monarchy. The Strength of it will still join it self to
France,
and grow the closer to it by its Disunion from the rest. And in this case the Advantages which must arise to that People from their intimate Alliance with the remaining part of the
Spanish
Dominions, wou'd in a very few Years not only repair all the Damages they have sustained in the present War, but fill the Kingdom with more Riches than it hath yet had in its most flourishing Periods.
The
French
King hath often enter'd on several expensive Projects, on purpose to dissipate the Wealth that is continually gathering in his Coffers in times of Peace. He hath employ'd immense Sums on Architecture, Gardening, Water-Works, Painting, Statuary, and the like, to distribute his Treasures among his People, as well as to humour his Pleasures and his Ambition: But if he once engrosses the Commerce of the
Spanish Indies,
whatever Quantities of Gold and Silver stagnate in his private Coffers, there will be still enough to carry on the Circulation among his Subjects. By this means in a short space of time he may heap up greater Wealth than all the Princes of
Europe
join'd together; and in the present Constitution of the World, Wealth and Power are but different Names for the same thing. Let us therefore suppose that after eight or ten Years of Peace, he hath a mind to infringe any of his Treaties, or invade a neighbouring State; to revive the Pretensions of
Spain
upon
Portugal,
or attempt the taking those Places which were granted us for our Security; what Resistance, what Opposition can we make to so formidable an Enemy? Shou'd the same Alliance rise against him that is now in War with him, what cou'd we hope for from it, at a time when the States engag'd in it will be comparatively weaken'd, and the Enemy who is now able to keep them at a stand, will have receiv'd so many new Accessions of Strength.
But I think it is not to be imagin'd that in such a Conjuncture as we here suppose, the same Confederates, or any other of equal Force cou'd be prevail'd upon to join their Arms and endeavour at the pulling down so exorbitant a Power. Some might be bought into his Interests by Money, others drawn over by Fear, and those that are liable to neither of these Impressions, might not think their own Interest so much concern'd as in the present War; or if any appear'd in a disposition to enter into such a Confederacy, they might be crush'd separately before they cou'd concert Measures for their mutual Defence.
The keeping together of the present Alliance can be ascribed to nothing else but the clear and evident Conviction which every Member of it is under, that if it shou'd once break without having had its effect, they can never hope for another Opportunity of reuniting, or of prevailing by all the joint Efforts of such an Union. Let us therefore agree on this as a fixt Rule, and an inviolable Maxim, never to lay down our Arms against
France,
till we have utterly disjoyn'd her from the
Spanish
Monarchy. Let this be the first Step of a publick Treaty, the Basis of a general Peace.
Had the present War indeed run against us, and all our Attacks upon the Enemy been vain, it might look like a degree of Frenzy, or a Mixture of Obstinacy and Despair, to be determin'd on so impracticable an Undertaking. But on the contrary, we have already done a great part of our Work, and are come within view of the End that we have been so long driving at. We remain victorious in all the Seats of War. In
Flanders
we have got into our hands several open Countries, rich Towns, and fortified Places. We have driven the Enemy out of all his Alliances, dispossest him of his Strong Holds, and ruin'd his Allies in
Germany.
We have not only recover'd what the Beginning of the War had taken from us, but possest ourselves of the Kingdom of
Naples,
the Dutchy of
Milan,
and an Avenue of
France
in
Italy.
The
Spanish
War hath given us a Haven for our Ships, and the most populous and wealthy Province of that Kingdom. In short, we have taken all the outlying parts of the
Spanish
Monarchy, and made Impressions upon the very Heart of it. We have beaten the
French
from all their advanc'd Posts in
Europe,
and driven them into their last Entrenchments. One vigorous Push on all sides, one general Assault will force the Enemy to cry out for Quarter, and surrender themselves at discretion. Another
Blenheim
or
Ramillies
will make the Confederates Masters of their own Terms, and Arbitrators of a Peace.
But notwithstanding the Advantages already gain'd are very considerable if we pursue them, they will be of no effect unless we improve them towards the carrying of our main point. The Enemy staggers; if you follow your Blow, he falls at your Feet; but if you allow him respite, he will recover his Strength, and come upon you with greater Fury. We have given him several repeated Wounds that have enfeebl'd him, and brought him low; but they are such as time will heal, unless you take advantage from his present Weakness to redouble your Attacks upon him. It was a celebrated part in
Caesar
's Character, and what comes home to our present purpose, that he thought nothing at all was done, while any thing remain'd undone. In short, we have been tugging a great while against the Stream, and have almost weather'd our point; a Stretch or two more will do the Work; but if instead of that we slacken our Arms, and drop our Oars, we shall be hurried back in a moment to the place from whence we first set out.
After having seen the Neecessity of an entire Separation of the Kingdoms of
France
and
Spain,
our Subject naturally leads us into the Consideration of the most proper means for effecting it.
We have a great while flatter'd ourselves with the prospect of reducing
France
to our own Terms by the want of Money among the People, and the Exigencies of the publick Treasury; but have been still disappointed by the great Sums imported from
America,
and the many new Expedients which the Court hath found out for its Relief. A long consumptive War is more likely to break the Grand Alliance, than disable
France
from maintaining sufficient Armies to oppose it. An arbitrary Government will never want Money; so long as the People have it; and so active a People will always have it, whilst they can send what Merchandises they please to
Mexico
and
Peru.
The
French
since their Alliance with
Spain
keep thirty Ships in constant Motion between the Western Ports of
France
and the South Seas of
America.
The King himself is an Adventurer in this Traffick, and besides the Share that he receives out of the Gains of his Subjects, has immense Sums that come directly from it into his own Hands.
We may further consider, that the
French
since their abandoning
Bavaria
and
Italy
have very much retrench'd the Expence of the War, and lay out among themselves all the Money that is consumed in it.
Many are of Opinion, that the most probable way of bringing
France
to Reason wou'd be by the making an Attempt upon the
Spanish West-Indies,
and by that means to cut off all Communication with this great Source of Riches, or turn the Current of it into our own Country. This I must confess carries so promising an appearance, that I would by no means discourage the Attempt: But at the same time I think it should be a collateral Project, rather than our principal Design. Such an Undertaking (if well concerted, and put into good Hands) would be of infinite Advantage to the Common Cause: but certainly an Enterprise that carries in it the Fate of
Europe,
should not turn upon the Uncertainty of Winds and Waves, and be liable to all the Accidents that may befal a Naval Expedition.
Others there are that have long deceiv'd themselves with the hopes of an Insurrection in
France,
and are therefore for laying out all our Strength on a Descent. These, I think, do not enough consider the natural Love which the gross of Mankind have for the Constitution of their Fathers. A Man that is not enlightned by Travail or Reflexion, grows as fond of Arbitrary Power, to which he hath been us'd from his Infancy, as of cold Climates or barren Countries, in which he hath been born and bred. Besides, there is a kind of sluggish Resignation, as well as poorness and degeneracy of Spirit, in a state of Slavery, that we meet with but very few who will be at the pains or danger of recovering themselves out of it; as we find in History Instances of Persons who after their Prisons have been flung open, and their Fetters struck off, have chosen rather to languish in their Dungeons, than stake their miserable Lives and Fortunes upon the Success of a Revolution. I need not instance the general Fate of Descents, the Difficulty of supplying Men and Provisions by Sea against an Enemy that hath both at hand, and without which it is impossible to secure those Conquests that are often made in the first Onsets of an Invasion. For these and other Reasons I can never approve the nursing up Commotions and Insurrections in the Enemy's Country, which for want of the necessary Support are likely to end in the Massacre of our Friends and the Ruin of their Families.
The only means therefore for bringing
France
to our Conditions, and what appears to me, in all human probability, a sure and infallible Expedient, is to throw in Multitudes upon 'em, and overpower 'em with Numbers, Would the Confederacy exert it self as much to annoy the Enemy, as they themselves for their Defence, we might bear them down with the weight of our Armies, and in one Summer overset the whole Power of
France.
The
French
Monarchy is already exhausted of its best and bravest Subjects. The Flower of the Nation is consum'd in its Wars: The Strength of their Armies consists at present of such as have saved themselves by flight from some or other of the victorious Confederates; and the only proper Persons to recruit them are but the Refuse of those who have been already pick'd out for the Service. Mareschal
de Vauban,
tho' infinitely partial in his Calculations of the Power of
France,
reckons that the Number of its Inhabitants was two Millions less at the Peace of
Ryswick,
than in the beginning of the War that was there concluded: And tho' that War continued Nine Years, and this hath as yet lasted but Six, yet considering that their Armies are more strong and numerous; that there hath been much more Action in the present War; and that their Losses sustain'd in it have been very extraordinary; we may, by a moderate Computation, suppose that the present War hath not been less prejudicial than the foregoing one in the Ravage which it has made aamong the People. There is in
France
so great a disproportion between the number of Males and Females; and among the former, between those who are capable of bearing Arms, and such as are too young, sickly, or decrepit for the Service; and at the same time such vast numbers of Ecclesiasticks, Secular and Religious, who live upon the Labours of others, that when the several Trades and Professions are supply'd, you will find most of those that are proper for War absolutely necessary for filling up the laborious part of Life, and carrying on the Underwork of the Nation. They have already contributed all their superfluous Hands, and every new Levy they make must be at the Expence of their Farms and Vineyards, their Manufactures and Commerce.
On the contrary, the Grand Alliance have innumerable Sources of Recruits, not only in
Britain
and
Ireland,
the
Ʋ nited Provinces,
and
Flanders;
but in all the populous parts of
Germany
that have little Trade or Manufactures, in proportion to the number of their Inhabitants. We may add, that the
French
have only
Switzerland,
besides their own Country, to recruit in; and we know the Difficulties they meet with in getting thence a single Regiment: Whereas the Allies have not only the same Ressource, but may be supply'd for Mony from
Denmark
and other Neutral States. In short, the Confederates may bring to the Field what Forces they please, if they will be at the charge of 'em: but
France,
let her Wealth be what it will, must content herself with the Product of her own Country.
The
French
are still in greater streights for Supplies of Horse than Men. The Breed of their Country is neither so good nor numerous as what are to be found in most of the Countries of the Allies. They had last Summer about Threescore Thousand in their several Armies, and cou'd not perhaps bring into the Field 30000 more, if they were dispos'd to make such an Augmentation.
The
French
Horse are not only few, but weak in comparison of ours. Their Cavalry in the Battle of
Blenheim
cou'd not sustain the Shock of the
British
Horse. For this reason our late way of attacking their Troops Sword in Hand is very much to the Advantage of our Nation, as our Men are more robust, and our Horses of a stronger Make than the
French;
and in such Attacks it is the Weight of the Forces, supposing equal Courage and Conduct, that will always carry it. The
English
Strength turn'd very much to account in our Wars against the
French
of old, when we us'd to gall them with our long Bows, at a greater Distance than they could shoot their Arrows: This Advantage we lost upon the Invention of Fire-Arms, but by the present Method our Strength as well as Bravery may again be of use to us in the Day of Battle.
We have very great Encouragement to send what Numbers we are able into the Field, because our Generals at present are such as are likely to make the best use of them, without throwing them away on any Rash Attempts or ill-concerted Projects. The Confederate Armies have the Happiness of being commanded by Persons who are esteem'd the greatest Leaders of the present Age, and are perhaps equal to any that have preceded them. There is a sort of Resemblance in their Characters; A particular Sedateness in their Conversation and Behaviour, that qualifies them for Council, with a great Intrepidity and Resolution that fits them for Action. They are all of them Men of conceal'd Fire, that doth not break out with Noise and Heat in the ordinary Circumstances of Life; but shews it self sufficiently in all great Enterprises that require it. 'Tis true, the General upon the
Rhine
hath not had the same Occasions as the others to signalize himself; but if we consider the great Vigilance, Activity and Courage, with the consummate Prudence, and the nice sense of Honour which appears in that Prince's Character, we have great reason to hope, that as he purchased the first Success in the present War, by forcing into the Service of the Confederates an Army that was rais'd against them in the very Heart of the Empire, he will give one of the finishing Strokes to it, and help to conclude the great Work which he so happily begun. The sudden Check that he gave to the
French
Army the last Campaign, and the good Order he establish'd in that of the
Germans,
look like happy Presages of what we may expect from his Conduct. I shall not pretend to give any Character of the Generals on the Enemy's side; but I think we may say this, that in the Eyes of their own Nation they are inferior to several that have formerly commanded the
French
Armies. If then we have greater Numbers than the
French,
and at the same time better Generals, it must be our own Fault if we will not reap the Fruit of such Advantages.
It would be loss of Time to explain any further our Superiority to the Enemy in Numbers of Men and Horse. We see plainly that we have the Means in our Hands, and that nothing but the Application of them is wanting. Let us only consider what use the Enemy would make of the Advantage we have mention'd if it fell on their side; and is it not very strange that we shou d not be as active and industrious for our Security, as they wou'd certainly be for our Destruction? But before we consider more distinctly the Method we ought to take in the Prosecution of the War, under this particular View, let us reflect a little upon those we have already taken in the Course of it for these six Years past.
The Allies after a successful Summer are too apt upon the Strength of it to neglect their Preparations for the ensuing Campaign, while the
French
leave no Art nor Stratagem untried to fill up the empty Spaces of their Armies, and swell 'em to an equal Bulk with those of the Confederates. By this means our Advantage is lost, and the Fate of
Europe
brought to a second Decision. It is now become an Observation that we are to expect a very indifferent Year after a very successful one.
Blenheim
was follow'd by a Summer that makes no noise in the War.
Ramillies, Turin,
and
Barcelona,
were the Parents of our last Campaign. So many dreadful Blows allarm'd the Enemy, and rais'd their whole Country up in Arms. Had we on our side made proportionable Preparations, the War by this time had been brought to a happy Issue. If after having gain'd the great Victories of
Blenheim
and
Ramillies
we had made the same Efforts as we should have done had we lost them, the Power of
France
could not have withstood us.
In the beginning of the Winter we usually get what Intelligence we can of the Force which the Enemy intends to employ in the Campaigns of the succeeding Year, and immediately cast about for a sufficient number of Troops to face them in the Field of Battle. This, I must confess, would be a good Method if we were engag'd in a Defensive War. We might maintain our Ground with an equal Number of Forces; but our Business is not only to secure what we are already in Possession of; we are to wrest the whole
Spanish
Monarchy out of the Hands of the Enemy; and in order to it, to work our Way into the Heart of his Country by dint of Arms. We should therefore put forth all our Strength, and without having any Eye to his Preparations, make the greatest Push that we are able on our own side. We are told that the Enemy at present thinks of raising Threescore Thousand Men for the next Summer; if we regulate our Levies in that View, we do nothing; let us perform our utmost, as they do, and we shall overwhelm 'em with our Multitudes. We have it in our Power at least to be four times as strong as the
French,
but if Ten Men are in War with Forty, and the latter detatch only an equal Number to the Engagement, what Benefit do they receive from their Superiority?
It seems therefore to be the Business of the Confederates to turn to their Advantage their apparent Odds in Men and Horse; and by that means to out-number the Enemy in all Rencounters and Engagements. For the same Reason it must be for the Interest of the Allies to seek all Opportunities of Battle, because all Losses on the opposite side are made up with infinitely more Difficulty than on ours; besides that the
French
do their Business by lying still, and have no other Concern in the War than to hold fast what they have already got into their Hands.
The Miscarriage of the noblest Project that ever was form'd in
Europe,
can be ascrib'd to nothing else but our want of Numbers in the several Quarters of the War. If our Armies on all sides had begun to busie and insult the Enemy, at the same time that the Forces march'd out of
Piemont, Toulon
had been at present in the Hands of the Duke of
Savoy.
But could that Prince ever have imagin'd that the
French
would have been at liberty to detatch whole Armies against him? Or will it appear credible to Posterity, that in a War carried on by the joint Force of so many populous and powerful Nations,
France
could send so great a part of its Troops to one Seat of the War, without suffering in any of the rest? Whereas it is well known, that if the Duke of
Savoy
had continued before
Toulon
eight Days longer, he had been attack'd by an Army of Sixty Thousand Men, which was more than double the Number of his own; and yet the Enemy was strong enough every where else to prevent the Confederates from making any Impression upon them. However, let us fall into the right Measures, and we may hope that the Stroke is only deferr'd. The Duke of
Savoy
hath secur'd a Passage into
Dauphiny,
and if the Allies make such Efforts in all Parts, as we may reasonably expect from them, that Prince may still make himself Master of the
French
Dominions on the other side of the
Rhone.
There is another part of our Conduct which may perhaps deserve to be consider'd. As soon as we have agreed with the States General upon any Augmentation of our Forces, we immediately negotiate with some or other of the
German
Princes, who are in the same Confederacy, to furnish out our Quota in Mercenaries. This may be doubly prejudicial to the Alliance; First, as it may have an ill Influence on the Resolutions of those Princes in the Diet of the Empire, who may be willing to settle as small a Quota as they can for themselves, that they may have more Troops to hire out; and in the next place, as it may hinder them from contributing the whole Quota which they have settled. This actually happen'd in the last Campaign, when we are told the
Germans
excus'd themselves for their want of Troops upon the
Rhine,
as having already put most of their Forces into the
British
and
Dutch
Service. Such an Excuse, indeed, is very unjust, but it would be better to give them no occasion of making it; and on such Occasions to consider what Men are apt to do, as well as what they may do with Reason.
It might therefore be for our Advantage that all the Foreign Troops in the
British
Pay shou'd be rais'd in Neutral Countries.
Switzerland
in particular, if timely applied to, might be of great use to us; not only in respect of the Reinforcements which we might draw from thence, but because such a Draught of Forces would lessen the Number of those that might otherwise be employ'd in the
French
Service. The Bulk of our Levies shou'd nevertheless be rais'd in our own Country, it being impossible for the Neutral States to furnish both the
British
and
Dutch
with a sufficient Number of effective Men; besides that the
British
Soldiers will be more at the Disposal of their General, and act with greater Vigour under the Conduct of one for whom they have so just a Value, and whom they do not consider only as their Leader, but as their Country-Man. We may likewise suppose that the Soldiers of a Neutral State, who are not animated by any National Interest, cannot fight for Pay with the same Ardour and Alacrity, as Men that fight for their Prince and Country, their Wives and Children.
It may likewise be worth while to consider whether the Military Genius of the
English
Nation may not fall by degrees, and become inferior to that of our neighbouring States, if it hath no occasion to exert it self. Minds that are altogether set on Trade and Profit, often contract a certain Narrowness of Temper, and at length become uncapable of great and generous Resolutions. Shou'd the
French
ever make an unexpected Descent upon us, we might want Soldiers of our own Growth to rise up in our Defence; and might not have time to draw a sufficient Number of Troops to our Relief from the remote Corners of
Germany.
It is generally said, that if King
Charles
II. had made War upon
France
in the beginning of his Reign, he might have conquer'd it by the many Veterans which were scatter'd up and down this Kingdom, and had been inur'd to Service in the Civil Wars. It is to be hop'd we shall never have such another Nursery of Soldiers; but if the present War gives a more Military Turn to all other Nations of
Europe,
than to our own, it is to be fear'd we may lose in Strength, what we gain in Number. We may apply the same Consideration nearer home. If all our Levies are made in
Scotland
or
Ireland,
may not those two Parts of the
British
Monarchy, after the disbanding of the present Army, be too powerful for the rest, in case of a Revolt, tho', God be thank'd, we are not in any danger of one at present. However, as these Considerations don't concern the more essential part of our Design, it is sufficient have mention'd them.
The sparing of our selves in so important a Conjuncture, when we have but this single Opportunity left for the preserving every thing that is pretious amongst us, is the worst sort of Management that we can possibly fall into. The good Husbandry of one Age may intail an endless Expence upon all Posterity. We must venture the sacrificing a part of our Lives and Fortunes at present, if we will effectually secure both for the future. The
British
Kingdom is so well stock'd with People, and so much abounds in Horse, that we have Power enough in our own Hands, did we make our utmost use of it, to humble
France,
and in a Campaign or two to put an end to the War.
There is not a more disagreeable Thought to the People of
Great Britain
than that of a standing Army. But if a Peace be made before the Disunion of
France
and
Spain,
there are few, perhaps, that will not think the maintaining a settled Body of numerous Forces indispensable for the Safety of our Country. We have it therefore in our Choice to raise such a strong Reinforcement of Troops as at present may be sufficient in Conjunction with those of the Allies, for breaking the Strength of the Enemy; or when the Peace is concluded, to keep on Foot such an Army as will be necessary for preventing his Attempts upon us.
It is to be hop'd that those who wou'd be the most zealous against keeping up a constant Body of Regular Troops after a General Peace, will the most distinguish themselves for the promoting an Augmentation of those which are now on Foot; and by that means take care that we shall not stand in need of such an Expedient.
We are indeed oblig'd by the present Situation of our Affairs to bring more Troops into the Field than we have yet done. As the
French
are retir'd within their Lines, and have collected all their Strength into a narrow Compass, we must have greater Numbers to charge them in their Entrenchments, and force them to a Battle. We saw the last Campaign that an Army of Fourscore Thousand of the best Troops in
Europe,
with the Duke of
Marlborough
at the Head of them, cou'd do nothing against an Enemy that were too numerous to be assaulted in their Camps, or attack'd in their Strong Holds.
There is another Consideration which deserves our utmost Attention. We know very well, that there is a Prince at the Head of a powerful Army, who may give a turn to the War, in which we are engag'd, if he thinks fit to side with either Party. I cannot presume to guess how far our Ministers may be inform'd of his Designs: But unless they have very strong Assurances of his falling in with the Grand Alliance, or not opposing it; they cannot be too circumspect and speedy in taking their Precautions against any contrary Resolution. We shall be unpardonable, if after such an Expence of Blood and Treasure, we leave it in the power of any single Prince to command a Peace, and make us accept what Conditions he thinks fit. It is certain, according to the Posture of our Affairs in the last Campaign, this Prince could have turn'd the Ballance on either side; but it is to be hop'd the Liberties of
Europe
will not depend any more on the Determination of one Man's Will. I don't speak this because I think there is any Appearance of that Prince's uniting himself to
France.
On the contrary, as he hath an extraordinary Zeal for the Reform'd Religion, and great Sentiments of Honour, I think it is not improbable we shou'd draw him over to the Confederacy, if we press him to it by proper Motives. His Love for Religion, and his Sense of Glory, will both have their effect on a Prince who hath already distinguish'd himself by being a Patron of Protestants, and Guarantee of the
Westphalian
Treaty. And if his Interest hath any part in his Actions, the Allies may make him greater Offers than the
French
King can do in the present Conjuncture. There are large Extents of Dominion in the forfeited Principalities of the Empire; doubtful Successions to which the King of
Sweden
seems to have very just Pretensions; and at the same time a great Title not yet dispos'd of, and a Seat of War on the
Moselle,
where none of our Generals have signaliz'd themselves. It would be Presumption to be particular in any Proposals on such an Occasion; it is enough to have shewn in general, that there are fair Opportunies, of which the Wisdom of the Confederates may make use.
Common Sense will direct us, when we see so warlike a Prince at the Head of so great an Army hovering on the Borders of our Confederates, either to obtain his Friendship, or secure ourselves against the Force of his Arms. We are sure, whatever numbers of Troops we raise, we shall have no Hands but what will turn to account. Nay, we are certain, that extraordinary Funds and Augmentations for one or two Campaigns may spare us the Expence of many Years, and put an end to Taxes and Levies for a whole Age; whereas a long parcimonious War will drain us of more Men and Money, and in the end may prove ineffectual.
There is still a great Popular Objection, which will be made to every thing that can be urg'd on this Subject. And indeed 'tis such a one as falls so much in with the Prejudices and little Passions of the Multitude, that when it is turn'd and set off to advantage by ill-designing Men, it throws a Damp on the publick Spirit of the Nation, and gives a check to all generous Resolutions for its Honour and Safety. In short, we are to be told, that
England
contributes much more than any other of the Allies, and that therefore it is not reasonable she shou'd make any Addition to her present Efforts. If this were true in Fact, I don't see any tolerable colour for such a Conclusion. Supposing among a Multitude embarqu'd in the same Vessel there are several that in the fury of a Tempest will rather perish than work for their Preservation; wou'd it not be Madness in the rest to stand idle, and rather chuse to sink together than do more than comes to their share? Since we are engag'd in a Work so absolutely necessary for our Welfare, the Remisness of our Allies should be an Argument for us to redouble our Endeavours rather than slacken them. If we must govern our selves by Example, let us rather imitate the Vigilance and Activity of the Common Enemy, than the Supineness and Negligence of our Friends.
We have indeed a much greater share in the War than any other part of the Confederacy. The
French
King makes at us directly, keeps a King by him to set over us, and hath very lately augmented the Salary of his Court, to let us see how much he hath that Design at heart. Few of the Nations in War with him, shou'd they ever fall into his hands, wou'd lose their Religion or Form of Government, or interfere at present with him in matters of Commerce. The
Dutch,
who are likely to be the greatest Losers after the
Britains,
have but little Trade to the
Levant
in comparison with ours, have no considerable Plantations or Commerce in the
West-Indies,
or any Woollen-Manufactures for
Spain;
not to mention the strong Barrier they have already purchas'd between
France
and their own Country.
But after all, every Nation in the Confederacy makes the same Complaint, and fancys itself the greatest Sufferer by the War. Indeed in so common a Pressure, let the Weight be never so equally distributed, every one will be most sensible of that part which lies on his own Shoulders. We furnish, without dispute, more than any other Branch of the Alliance: but the question is, whether others do not exert themselves in proportion according to their respective Strength. The Emperor, the King of
Prussia,
the Elector of
Hannover,
as well as the States of
Holland
and the Duke of
Savoy,
seem at least to come up to us. The greatest Powers in
Germany
are borrowing Mony where they can get it, in order to maintain their stated Quota's, and go thorough their part of the Expence: and f any of the Circles have been negligent, they have paid for it much more in their late Contributions, than what wou'd have furnish'd out their Share in the common Charges of the War.
There are others who will object the Poverty of the Nation, and the Difficulties it wou'd find in furnishing greater Supplies to the War than it doth at present. To this we might answer, that if the Nation were really as poor as this Objection makes it, it shou'd be an Argument for enforcing rather than diminishing our present Efforts against
France.
The sinking our Taxes for a few Years wou'd be only a temporary Relief, and in a little time occasion far greater Impositions, than those which are now laid upon us. Whereas the seasonable Expence of part of our Riches, will not only preserve the rest; but by the right use of them procure vast Additions to our present Stock. It may be necessary for a Person languishing under an ill Habit of Body to lose several Ounces of Blood, notwithstanding it will weaken him for a time, in order to put a new Ferment into the remaining Mass, and draw into it fresh Supplies.
But we can by no means make this Concession, to those who so industriously publish the Nation's Poverty. Our Country is not only rich, but abounds in Wealth much more than any other of the same Extent in
Europe-France,
notwithstanding the Goodness of its Climate, the Fertility of its Soil, the Multitude of its Inhabitants, its convenient Harbours, both for the
Ocean
and
Mediterranean,
and its present Correspondence with the
West-Indies,
is not to compare with
Great Britain
in this particular. I shall transcribe word for word the Passage of a late celebrated
French
Author, which will lay this Matter in its full light; and leave the Reader to make the counter-part of the Parallel between the two Nations.
"According to all the Inquiries that I have been able to make during several Years, in which I have apply'd my self to this sort of Remarks, I have observ'd, that about a Tenth part of the People of this Kingdom are reduc'd to Beggary, and are actual Beggars. That among the Nine other parts, Five are not in a condition to give Alms or Relief to those aforemention'd, being very near reduc'd themselves to the same miserable Condition. Of the Four other remaining Parts, Three are very uneasy in their Circumstances, and embarass'd with Debts and Law-Suits. In the Tenth part, I reckon the Soldiers, Lawyers, Ecclesiasticks, Merchants and substantial Citizens, which cannot make up more than a Hundred Thousand Families. And I believe I should not be mistaken, if I shou'd say, that there are not above Ten Thousand of these Families, who are very much at their ease: and if out of these Ten Thousand we shou'd take the Men that are employ'd in Publick Business, with their Dependents and Adherents, as also those whom the King supports by his Bounty, with a few Merchants, the number of those who remain will be surprisingly little."
Dixme Royale.
What a dreadful Account is this of Nineteen Millions of People; for so many the Author reckons in that Kingdom. How can we see such a Multitude of Souls cast under so many Subdivisions of Misery, without reflecting on the Absurdity of a Form of Government that sacrifices the Ease and Happiness of so many reasonable Beings to the Glory of one of their Fellow-Creatures. But this is not our Affair at present.
If we run over the other Nations of
Europe
that have any part in the present War, we shall only pass through so many different Scenes of Poverty.
Spain, Portugal,
and
Savoy
are reduc'd to great Extremities.
Germany
is exhausted to the last degree in many parts of it, and in others plundered of all she had left.
Holland
indeed flourishes above the rest in Wealth and Plenty: But if we consider the infinite Industry and Penuriousness of that People, the Coarseness of their Food and Raiment, their little Indulgences of Pleasure and Excess, it is no wonder that notwithstanding they furnish as great Taxes as their Neighbours, they make a better figure under them. In a Commonwealth there are not so many overgrown Estates as in Monarchies, the Wealth of the Country is so equally distributed, that most of the Community are at their Ease, though few are plac'd in extraordinary Points of Splendour and Magnificence. But notwithstanding these Circumcumstances may very much contribute to the seeming Prosperity of the
Ʋ nited Provinces,
we know they are indebted many Millions more than their whole Republick is worth, and if we consider the variety of Taxes and Impositions they groan under at a time when their private Dissensions run high, and some of the wealthiest parts of the Government refuse to bear their share in the publick Expence, we shall not think the Condition of that People so much to be envied as some amongst us would willingly represent it.
Nor is
Great Britain
only rich as she stands in comparison with other States, but is really so in her own intrinsick Wealth. She had never more Ships at Sea, greater quantities of Merchandise in her Warehouses, larger Receipts of Customes, or more numerous Commodities rising out of her Manufactures than she has at present. In short, she sits in the midst of a mighty Affluence of all the Necessaries and Conveniencies of Life. If our Silver and Gold diminishes, our publick Credit continues unimpair'd, and if we are in want of Bullion, it lies in our own power to supply our selves. The old
Roman
General, when he heard his Army complain of Thirst, shew'd 'em the Springs and Rivers that lay behind the Enemy's Camp. It is our own case: The Rout of a
Spanish
Army would make us Masters of the
Indies.
If Prince
Eugene
takes upon him the Command of the Confederate Forces in
Catalonia,
and meets with that Support from the Alliance which they are capable of giving him, we have a fair Prospect of reducing
Spain
to the entire Obedience of the House of
Austria.
The
Silesian
Fund (to the immortal Reputation of those generous Patriots who were concern'd in it) enabled that Prince to make a Conquest of
Italy,
at a time when our Affairs were more desperate there, than they are at present in the Kingdom of
Spain.
When our Parliament has done their utmost, another publick spirited Project of the same nature, which the Common Enemy cou'd not foresee nor prepare against, might in all probability set King
Charles
upon the Throne for which he hath so long contended. One pitcht Battle wou'd determine the Fate of the
Spanish
Continent.
Let us therefore exert the united Strength of our whole Island, and by that means put a new Life and Spirit into the Confederates, who have their Eyes fixt upon us, and will abate or increase their Preparations according to the Example that is set them. We see the Necessity of an Augmentation if we intend to bring the Enemy to Reason, or rescue our Country from the Miseries that may befal it; and we find our selves in a condition of making such an Augmentation as, by the Blessing of God, cannot but prove effectual. If we carry it on vigorously we shall gain for our selves and our Posterity a long a glorious and a lasting Peace; but if we neglect so fair an Opportunity, we may be willing to employ all our Hands, and all our Treasures when it will be too late, and shall be tormented with one of the most melancholy Reflexions of an afflicted Heart, That it was once in our Power to have made our selves and our Children happy.
FINIS.