THE OLD WHIG. NUMB. II. WITH REMARKS UPON THE
PLEBEIAN,
No II.
———Eja!
Quid statis? Nolunt. Atqui licet esse Beatis.
Quid causae est, meritò quin illis Jupiter ambas
Iratus buccas inflet; neque se fore posthàc
Tam Facilem dicat?—
Hor.
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MDCCXIX. [Price 6
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THE OLD WHIG.
With
REMARKS
upon the
PLEBEIAN, No II.
THE Author of the
Plebeian,
to shew himself a perfect Master
in the Vocation of Pamphlet Writing,
begins like a Son of
Grubstreet,
with declaring the great Esteem he has for himself, and the Contempt he entertains for the Scribblers of the Age. One wou'd think, by his way of representing it, that the unexpected Appearance of his Pamphlet was as great a Surprize upon the World as that of the late Meteor, or indeed something more terrible, if you will believe the Author's magnificent Description of his own Performance.
The
Plebeian,
Page
2.
says he,
starting forth unexpectedly, they were forced like People in a Surprize, or on an Invasion, to March immediately any Troops they had.
If Cardinal
Alberoni
's Attempt, which furnishes the Allusion, succeeds no better than that of his Friend the Pamphleteer, he won't have much to boast of.
Our Author, in his triumphant Progress, first animadverts on a Writer, whom he says he never read, which being my own Case, I shall leave that Writer to defend himself. The second he mentions, considering the Strength of his Arguments, and the Closeness of his Reasoning, deserved a little more regard from the
Plebeian,
who, it seems,
with much ado went thro' the Performance.
This wou'd certainly have been true, had he gone through it with a design to Answer it.
Having routed
Baronius,
and confounded
Bellarmine,
pass we on to the next,
said the Country Curate to his admiring Audience. Our Author pursues his Conquests with the same Satisfaction and Intrepidity. In the first place he is angry with a Writer for assuming the Name of the
Old Whig,
who may more justly recriminate upon this Author for taking that of the
Plebeian,
a Title which he is by no means fond of retaining, if we may give Credit to many shrewd Guessers. But he tells the Old Whig, that he
expected
from that Title
no less than the utmost Wrath and Indignation against the House of Lords.
6
and
How does this agree with the Censure he passes upon him afterwards, for
treating that Species in such a manner as he dares not venture to repeat!
I must however remind this Author of the
Milk
with which he
nurses our Nobles,
not to omit his
stagnated Pool
; Passages of such a Nature, that in Imitation of the Author, I shall dispatch them with an
Horresco referens!
The Author, in the next Paragraph, gives us a Definition of the Point in Debate,
viz.
that
it is a Jumble and a Hodge-Podge.
A most clear, comprehensive, and elegant Account of the Matter!
The Author then continues his Animosities against the Ephori of
Lacedaemon
; but this Passage I shall wave for two Reasons, First, Because it is nothing to the Purpose. Secondly, Because I am informed there are two or three keen Disputants, who will return a proper Answer to it, when they have discover'd the Author.
The
Plebeian
proceeds to detect an imaginary Mistake in the Old Whig, for having asserted that
there has been as great an Alteration in one Branch of the Legislature, as is now proposed to be made in another.
A Fact immediately puts an end to a Dispute, and, in the Case before us, stands thus,
King
Henry
VIII. added to the House of Commons
38 Members.
King
Edward
VI.
44
Queen
Mary
25
Queen
Elizabeth
62
King
James
I.
27
The Question now is, whether the Restraining the Number of the House of Commons to what it is at present, was not as great an Alteration in that Branch of the Legislature, as the Restriction now proposed wou'd be to the other Branch of the Legislature, shou'd it take place in it. To which I shall add the following Question, Whether the Inconveniencies arising from that continual Increase in the House of Commons, did not make the Restraint upon it prudent and necessary; and Whether if the like Inconveniencies arise from this perpetually increasing House of Lords, it is not as necessary and as prudent to put a stop to it? As for the little Towns of
Watchet
and
Dunster,
our Author can draw nothing from them to the Advantage of his Cause, if he can bestow Labour and Time enough, of which he finds it necessary to be very sparing in this Argument, to peruse the printed List of Counties and Boroughs, to whom the Privilege of sending Representatives to Parliament was granted or restored by the several Princes above-mentioned; and to Answer the short Query proposed to him at the end of it, with relation to Queen
Elizabeth.
After having proposed these Questions in plain Terms, I come in the next Place to one of the Plebeian's, which is carried on in Metaphor, till it ends in something that is past my Understanding.
But these Retrenchments being now made. The Question,
says he,
P.
6.
at present is, whether the Commons ought to go on stripping the Crown of every Jewel till it becomes less resplendent than the Doge of
Venice
's Coronet, or less comfortable than the Sword-bearer's Cap of Maintenance?
I shall only confront this metaphorical Query with one that is adapted to Men of ordinary Capacities.
These Retrenchments being made, whether the Commons ought to accept the Offer of the Crown, to part with a Prerogative that is still exorbitant and dangerous to the Community?
But our Author's chief Concern is for the poor House of Commons, whom he represents as naked and defenceless,
P.
6.
when the Crown, by losing this Prerogative, wou'd be
less able to protect them against the Power of a House of Lords.
Who forbears laughing, when the
Spanish
Friar represents little
Dickey,
under the Person of
Gomez,
insulting the Colonel that was able to fright him out of his Wits with a single Frown?
This Gomez,
says he,
flew upon him like a Dragon, got him down, the Devil being strong in him, and gave him Bastinado on Bastinado, and Buffet upon Buffet, which the poor meek Colonel being prostrate, suffer'd with a most Christian Patience.
The Improbability of the Fact never fails to raise Mirth in the Audience; and one may venture to answer for a
British
House of Commons, if we may guess from it's Conduct hitherto, that it will scarce be either so tame or so weak, as our Author supposes.
The
Plebeian,
to turn off the Force of the Remark upon another Paragraph, has Recourse to a Shift that is of great Use to controversial Writers, by affirming that his Antagonist mistakes his Meaning. Let the impartial Reader judge whether an Answer that proves this Alteration
wou'd not be detrimental to the House of Peers,
is not suited to an Objection which says in so many Words,
P.
7.
that
it wou'd be detrimental to the House of Peers it self.
But says the
Plebeian
in this his Reply to the
Old Whig, It will not be detrimental to them in point of Power, but it will be detrimental on Account of those Talents which ought to accompany Power, the Want of which the Commons will feel in their Judicature.
Which is, in other Words,
I do not mean when I say that it
will be detrimental to the House of Peers it self,
that it will be detrimental to the Peers, but that it will be detrimental to the Commons.
I appeal to any Man, whether the
Old Whig ignorantly mistook
the natural Sense of those Words; or whether the
Plebeian
ignorantly exprest, that which he now says was his Meaning in those Words. The
Plebeian
having in his former Paper represented, that this old standing Body of Peers without receiving numerous Additions from Time to Time, wou'd
become corrupt and offensive like a stagnated Pool,
tells us here in excuse for 'em,
P.
7
that
they will be offensive to others but not perceive it themselves
▪ If I cou'd suppose, with the Author, that they wou'd ever be in this Lamentable Pickle, I shou'd be of his Opinion that they ought to be
sweetned by such wholsome, pure and fresh Streams as are continually passing into them.
The
Plebeian
next Objects to the
Old Whig
's Calculation of the probable Extinction of two Titles, taking one Year with another.
By the Calculation generally received,
says this Author,
I suppose he means the List published by way of Prelude to this Project.
Whereas the
Old Whig
cou'd not take that List for his Calculation, but formed his Calculation from that List, and from the Nature of the Alteration which is proposed. This Objection will immediately vanish upon discovering the Fallacy of the
Plebeian
's Argument. He supposes no greater Number of Extinctions wou'd happen among the
English
Lords, were their Numbers settled at 184, than happen'd in that Body when they were only 59.104.142.153, 162. or 168. At this rate of calculating, the
Plebeian
will be sure of gaining his Point, and affirms very truly that the Extinctions by a just Medium amount to no more than a Peer and a half for every Year. But I appeal to honest Mr.
Wingate,
who was never looked upon as a Party-Writer, whether my Calculation will not appear very just, if examined by his Golden Rule, and other curious Operations of Arithmetick, which are to be met with in his Works. Especially when the Bill, as it evidently tends to multiply Extinctions, by preventing the Peerage from running into Collateral Lines, or descending to Females, will more than answer my Computation, if I should have the Misfortune to disagree with the
Plebeian
about some very minute Fraction of a Lord, that might happen in the Space of 116 Years. As for those contingent Vacancies which may be made by the Edge of the Law, our Author regards the Uncertainty of them as a very uncomfortable Prospect to the Candidates for Patrician Honours, since they may have
time enough to try all their Patience,
if they live in Hopes of such a Expedient for their Promotion. The ascertaining of this Point is indeed what I am not equal to, and must therefore leave it to the Masters of Political Calculation. But our Author is afraid, that if such lucky Opportunities of Extinction shou'd happen, Lords may still sit with their Heads on, unless a seasonable Increase may be made to 'em in such critical Junctures. This, I must confess, is to me one very great Reason for the Alteration proposed; being fully of Opinion with the
Old Whig,
as exprest in the following Words,
Whig.
19.
Is this Inconvenience better prevented in a House of Peers on the Bottom it now stands? Can any who has been a good Minister be secure, if the Crown shou'd add a sufficient Number of his Enemies to those who sit in Judgment upon him? Or is a bad Minister in any Danger, when he may be shelter'd by the Addition of a sufficient Number of his Friends?
The
Plebeian
's Answer to this Passage is highly satisfactory:
P.
9.
In either of these Cases,
says he,
the utmost Iniquity must be suppos'd in the Crown, which I must confess I cannot bring my self to do, and therefore my Argument remains entire.
I very much approve of the Author's dutiful and submissive Behaviour to the Crown, which puts one in mind of the worthy Alderman, who, upon hearing a Member of the Common-Council call the Emperor
Nero a Monster of Cruelty,
told him,
he ought not to speak disrespectfully of a Crowned Head.
But if the Author will only go such Lengths with me, as to allow there ever has been a bad Soveraign, or not to shock him with such a Supposition, that there has ever been a wicked Ministry, and that it is not utterly impossible but there may be such in Times to come, my Argument stands entire. God be thanked, we are now blest with a good King, and with the Prospect of such for our Days, but cannot answer for those who are yet unborn, since they will still be Men, and therefore liable to Imperfection.
The
Plebeian
was hard set by the Answer of the
Old Whig
to his Arguments, That the
Limitation of the Number of the Lords wou'd run the Constitution into an Aristocracy,
and has therefore very prudently shuffled the Consideration of that Point under another Head, where he forgets the
Old Whig
's Reply to what was urged against his Opinion in that Case, so that he has visibly given up the Point which was most material in his first
Plebeian.
The
Old Whig
's Remark therefore still stands out against him unanswer'd; and plainly turns his own ill Consequence upon him, by shewing there is a visible Tendency to an Aristocracy as the Constitution now stands, which would be taken away by the Alteration proposed. But it is ungenerous to insult a baffled Adversary; I shall therefore proceed to the next Particular in dispute.
The
Old Whig
affirms that
the Power of giving Money and raising Taxes is confined to the Body of the Commons,
and that
all the Privileges together of the Lords are not equal to that One of commanding the Purse of the Community.
The
Plebeian
allows the Consequence, but cavils at the Position, which is a received Maxim among the Commons of
England,
the Doctrine of the House of Commons in particular, and established by the Practice of every Parliament in the Memory of Man. Let us now see what the
Plebeian
affirms in Contradiction to it, and by the way observe whether he personates his Part well, and speaks the Language of one who writes himself a
Member of the House of Commons.
The Author asserts, That
whether a Money-Bill may not originally take its Rise in the House of Lords, is a Point never yet clearly given up by their Lordships, if he is not very much misinformed.
This Point, if I am not very much misinformed, was never claimed by the House of Lords, and has not a single Precedent in the Practice of that Body in the Legislature.
P.
13.
He afterwards asserts that
the Commons have no more Power over their Fellow-Subjects Estates than the Lords.
Is not the Power of granting a Supply, fixing the Quantum of that Supply, appropriating every Part of it to particular Uses, and settling the Ways and Means for raising it; is not this Power over their Fellow-Subjects Estates much greater than that of the Lords, who can neither add to, diminish, nor after any one of these Particulars? And if the Power of the Commons extends it self to all these Points, how can the Author further affirm, that
all which is peculiar to the Commons in this Matter is, that they have hitherto been allow'd to chuse what Tax they judged easiest for the People!
But what Shadow of Reason is there for him to proceed in asserting, that
every Day's Experience shews us, that if the Lords differ in Opinion from the Commons, their Power is at an end
; since, on the contrary, Experience shews us, that whenever the Lords have pretended to such a Power, they have always been over-ruled by the Commons!
P.
9.
Our Author tells us
the Concurrence of the Lords is as necessary to a Money-Bill as to any other Bill.
That is not deny'd; but he must allow that the Lords Concurrence to a Money-Bill is not of the same Nature with their Concurrence to any other Bill, which they may undoubtedly change, amend, and return upon the Hands of the House of Commons for their Concurrence in such Amendments as the Lords shall think proper. Besides, to shew the
Plebeian
▪ how much the Purse of the Community is at the Command of the Commons, let him consider the Case of a Vote of Credit, which is transacted wholly between the Soveraign and the Lower House. To this we may add, that the Soveraign himself, in his Speeches to Parliament, applies that Part which relates to Money to the House of Commons, distinct from that of the Lords; by which Method it is plain the Crown supposes those Privileges are vested in the House of Commons, to which every Member of that House has always pretended, excepting the present Author.
The
Plebeian
in the next Paragraph makes use of a very sure and wise Method of confounding his Antagonist, by putting his own Sense upon a Passage in that Author's Pamphlet. The
Old Whig
represents how dangerous it would be to our Constitution, if the Crown, which is already possest of a certain Means to over-rule one Branch of the Legislature, should ever be able to influence the Elections of a House of Commons, so as to gain one to its Measures; in which Case, if Liberty was endanger'd in the Lower House, it could not make a Stand in the other. The
Plebeian
perverts this Meaning after the following Manner;
This Author,
says he,
assures us,
P.
10.
that the Crown has Power enough to gain a House of Commons of what Complexion it pleases
; and after puzzling himself in his own voluntary Blunder, is displeased with the
Old Whig
for not proposing to cure an Inconvenience which he never affirmed to be in the House of Commons, as well as that which he proves to be in the House of Lords; so that he would have had him quit the Subject which he had undertaken, to speak of one which he had nothing to do with. But supposing the
Plebeian
had rightly stated the Sense of the Author, the Inconvenience in the House of Lords is that which is woven into its very Constitution, and therefore at all times exposes us to its ill Consequences; whereas what the
Plebeian
suggests with regard to the House of Commons, is only extrinsick, and accidental to that Body, if it ever happens in it.
It is not probable that this Dispute between the
Plebeian
and the
Old Whig
will last many Weeks: But if there was time to discuss the whole Point, I think it may be shown to a Demonstration, that the Check of the Crown upon the House of Commons, which is the Power of
Dissolution,
is, by infinite Degrees, a weaker Check than that it has in the present Constitution upon the House of Lords, which is the Power of
Adding
to it what Number, at what Time, and for what Purpose it pleases: Nay, that the Power of Dissolution is also in its Nature a Check upon the House of Lords as it dissolves them in a Legislative Capacity, and may break the most dangerous Cabals against the Crown, which are such as may be formed between the Leaders of the Two Houses. These two Points, if drawn out into such Considerations as naturally rise from them, wou'd fully establish the Necessity of three Branches in a perfect Legislature, and demonstrate that they shou'd be so far separate and distinct from each other, as is essential to Legislative Bodies: Or, as the
Old Whig
has before explained it,
If one Part of the Legislature may any ways be invested with a Power to force either of the other Two to concur with it, the Legislative Power is in Reality, whatever it may pretend to, divided into no more than two Branches.
I have hitherto followed the
Plebeian
in his own Method, by examining,
First,
his Replies to the Objections made by the
Old Whig
; and come now to his
Second
general Head, wherein he formally proposes to
consider the Argument as the Old Whig states it himself.
And here I was not a little surprized to find, that instead of answering the several distinct Arguments urged by that Author, in Defence of the Bill: as drawn from the Nature of Government in general; from the
British
Constitution; from its Effects on the Crown; on the House of Commons; on the whole Body of the
English
Commonalty; and from the ill Consequences it wou'd remedy in the present Constitution; the
Plebeian
contents himself with attacking but one single Argument of his Antagonist. Till the
Plebeian
shall have answer'd those other Points, I shall take it for granted, that he gives them up. Not to multiply Words, I believe every Reader will allow me that an Author is not to be much regarded, who writes professedly in Answer to a Discourse which proceeds on many Arguments, when he singles out the Argument only which he thinks is the weakest; especially when he fails in his Answer even to that single Argument. A famous
French
Author compares the imaginary Triumphs of such a kind of Disputant, whom he was then dealing with, to those of
Claudius,
which, instead of being represented by the strong Towns he had taken, and the Armies he had defeated, were testified to the People of
Rome,
by a Present of Cockle-Shells that he had gather'd up on the Sea-Shore.
But to come to the Matter before us. The
Old Whig,
after having considered it in several Views, examines it with Regard to the whole Bulk of the
British
Commons. Under this Head he has the following Words.
But the great Point, and which ought to carry the chief Weight with us in this Case, is, that the Alteration now propos'd, will give such a mighty Power to the Bulk of the
English
Commons, as can be never counterbalanc'd by the Body of the Nobility.
Now what the
Old Whig
here calls the Great Point with Regard to the Commonalty of
England,
the
Plebeian
insinuates he calls the Great Point with Regard to the whole Controversy, and descants upon it accordingly. Whereas it is evident the Author insists upon many Points as Great as This in other Views of the Question. The
Old Whig
affirms, that the
Commonalty
has infinitely more Wealth than the
Nobility,
which was the proper Consideration of this Place. The
Plebeian
returns for Answer, that the
Commonalty
is indeed much richer than the
Nobility,
but that the
House of Commons
is not so rich; which was not the proper Consideration of this Place. It is impossible for a Disputant to lose the Cause, who is a Master of such Distinctions. I remember I was once present at an University Disputation, which was managed on the one Side by a notable
Peripatetick.
The Question which he defended in the Negative was,
Whether Comets are above the Moon?
The Sophister being press'd very hard by the Force of Demonstration, very gravely extricated himself out of it by the following Distinction.
Comets,
said he,
are Two-fold,
Supra-lunar,
and
Sub-lunar.
That
Supra-lunar
Comets are above the Moon I do allow; but that
Sub-lunar
Comets are above the Moon I utterly deny. And it is of this latter kind of Comets that the Question is to be understood.
The Fallacy of the
Plebeian
's Answer being thus far discover'd, all that he further adds in his own way of arguing will be easily confuted by unravelling the Matter which he has very artificially perplex'd. The
Old Whig
supposes that every Lord in the Legislature, taken one with another, may be worth 5000
l.
a Year, in which, for Argument's sake, every one knows his Concession has been vastly too liberal. The
Plebeian
values every Member of the House of Commons at 800
l. per Annum
one with another, in which 'tis plain he has been exceeding Scanty. Nay many are of Opinion that upon casting up the whole Sum of Property that now resides in the House of Lords, it wou'd not exceed that which is in the House of Commons. If this Particular approaches to the Truth, all the Arguments of a Superior Power arising from its greater Property fall to the Ground of themselves, as being raised on a false Foundation. To which I must further add, that if this increasing Power still continues in the Crown, the Property of the House of Peers will
indisputably
surmount that of the House of Commons; and that on the contrary, if the Bill passes, it visibly tends to prevent the Impoverishment of the House of Commons in point of Property, and to fill it with Men of such Estates, as in a few Years will be more than a Counterbalance to the House of Lords, even under this View.
But further to shew the Weakness of the
Plebeian
's Reasonings upon this Head, I will allow that the House of Lords enjoy at present, and may still continue to enjoy, a greater Share of Property than the House of Commons. But notwithstanding this Concession, to which the Nature of the Thing does not oblige me, it is still evident that the immense Property which subsists in the Bulk of the
English
Commons, will render their Representatives more powerful than the Body of the Lords. This will plainly appear from considering the very Nature of Representatives; from those Junctures which can possibly give them an Occasion of exerting their Power; and from Matter of Fact.
It is implied in the very Nature of Representatives, that they are back'd with the Power of those whom they represent: As the Demands of a Plenipotentiary, let his Personal Wealth or Power be as little as you please, have the same Weight with them as if they were made by the Person of his Principal. I will beg leave to borrow from the
Plebeian
an Example of the Bank of
England,
which, as he makes use of it, has no manner of Analogy with the Subject of the Dispute. Is not the whole Stock of that numerous Community under the Guidance of a few Directors? And will any one say, that these Directors have no other Influence on the Publick, than what arises to them from the Share which they personally enjoy in that Stock? The Author urges that the Peers are Principals, which in Reality is the reason why their Power is not to be apprehended in Opposition to that of the Commons; whereas were they only Representatives of a Body immensely rich and numerous, they wou'd beside their own Personal Property have such a Support, as wou'd make them truly formidable. The whole Commons of
England
are the Principals on one side, as the Lords are the Principals on the other; and which of these Principals are arm'd with most Power and Property?
To consider in the next place those Junctures that can possibly give them an Occasion of exerting their Power it is on both sides suppos'd to be in such Cases as will affect the Rights of the
English
Commonalty, in which Case every Commoner of
England
is as much concern'd as any of their Representatives. Thus if four
London
Citizens, to make the Case exactly parallel, were deputed to maintain the Rights of their Principals, as Citizens, who can imagine that they wou'd not be supported by the whole Power and Property of the City, and not be too hard for any two or three great Men, who had ten times their Personal Estates? Now as the
Plebeian
's Supposition reduces things to the last Extremity, it can only take place in a Rupture, which is never likely to happen. And in that Case, as these two great Bodies must act separately, there is no room for considering how far the Concurrence of the House of Lords is necessary in a Money Bill, which entirely takes away the Author's Reasoning in his 13th Page.
But Matters of Fact are the best Arguments. We both agree that Power arises out of Property, and the Author himself has given an Instance of the Power of the House of Commons in having been able to effect the Ruin of the Monarchy and Peerage. Whence had the Commons this Power, but from being supported by their Principals?
The
Plebeian
thinks he strengthens his Point, by adding that the Lords are a fixt Body. To this I might reply, that the Principals of the House of Commons are as fixt a Body as the Lords; and therefore, however their Representatives may vary, they will continue intent, from Age to Age, to assert and vindicate their peculiar Rights and Privileges, unless we can believe that any Body of Men will act against those two strong Motives of Self-Interest and Self-Preservation. I might further venture to say, that Men of the greatest Wealth and Weight in the House of Commons, are almost as sure of a Seat there, as if it came to 'em by Inheritance. But supposing the House of Lords never so much fix'd, and so manageable by two or three great Men (for which very reason Additions are very often made to 'em, which the Alteration wou'd prevent); we have seen that their United Power, if their Number is limited, can never be a Match for that of the House of Commons, supposing still such a Rupture, as the
Plebeian
all along imagines, in which each Body is to act separately for it self.
The Author, in the remaining part of his Pamphlet, appears like every Writer that is driven out of all his Holds. He endeavours to set the Crown, and the whole Body of Peers, upon his Adversary; accuses him in effect of
Scandalum Magnatum
; nay, and gives very broad Intimations that he ought to be indicted for High-Treason.
I shou'd not have given my self, or the Publick, all this Trouble, had I not been so peremptorily call'd to it by the last
Plebeian.
I do assure him, my Silence hitherto was not the effect of Old Age, as it has made me
Slow,
but to tell him the Truth, as it has made me a little
Testy,
and consequently impatient of Contradiction, when I find my self in the right. I must own however, that the Writer of the
Plebeian
has made the most of a Weak Cause, and do believe that a good one wou'd shine in his Hands; for which reason I shall advise him, as a Friend, if he goes on in his
new Vocation,
to take care that he be as happy in the Choice of his Subject, as he is in the Talents of a Pamphleteer.
FINIS.