SPEECH OF
Mr. FRANCIS,
ON THE SUSPENSION OF THE HABEAS CORPUS ACT,
FRIDAY, JANUARY 23, 1795.
MR. FRANCIS rose, and addressed himself to the Speaker, in the following terms:
Mr. Speaker,
There were some material passages in the speech of the learned gentleman opposite to me, which I think myself called upon to take the earliest opportunity to answer, while they are yet fresh in my memory and in the recollection of the House. They were not addressed to
me
particularly; but, as they conveyed a charge against the principles and proceedings of a Society, to which I belong, and from whose cause I am not at all disposed to separate my own, I consider myself as a person put upon his defence, and therefore intitled for a short time to the attention of the House. No man is less likely to abuse it than I am. Sir, I am not going to find fault with the honourable gentleman's personal deportment in this House, or to the language he makes use of. They are always civil and conciliating, and therefore he may be sure that nothing is farther from my thoughts than to offer him any offence. It is to his assertions and to his doctrines that I mean to oppose contradiction and resistance. But, first of all, allow me to clear my honourable friend near me of a very unjust imputation thrown upon his conduct this day, as if he had irregularly taken the opening of the debate out of the hands of the learned gentleman, to whom, as mover of the question, it did undoubtedly belong. Now, Sir, on this point I shall content myself with appealing to your testimony, when I affirm that the learned gentleman moved the second reading of the bill, without offering to say one word even of introduction to that motion, and that you were going to put the question, and must have done so, if my honourable friend had not then risen to oppose it. The learned gentleman says, he understood it was agreed that the debate should be taken on the subsequent motion for your leaving the chair. If so, he purposely reserved himself for a later stage of the bill, and has clearly acquitted my honourable friend of taking the debate out of his hands. But I know of no such agreement. On the contrary, I perfectly recollect it was stated to him, from this side of the House, that it was intended to debate the principle of the bill, which could not be done at any time so properly as on the motion for the second reading.
I find, Sir, that the Society of Gentlemen, associated for the purpose of obtaining a Parliamentary Reform, of all of whom invidually he speaks with great civility, are no favourites of his in their collective capacity. It is very difficult for us to give him satisfaction. If we continue our proceedings, it leads to dangerous consequences, though possibly our intentions may be innocent. We are exciting discontent and faction among the people, and encouraging others to go lengths, to which we perhaps may not be determined to follow them. We shall be answerable then as, in fact, the abettors and promoters of mischief, in which at first we do not partake, and which afterwards we might be determined to resist. If we resolve to suspend our proceedings, that's ten times worse; that's a resolution, which fills the learned gentleman with horror and dismay! The moment we leave off acting at all, we excite and exhort the people to have recourse to the most dangerous and criminal excesses! It is difficult to conceive, by what medium in our conduct we could thoroughly have satisfied the learned gentleman. All I shall say is, that his judgement of our conduct is not quite impartial, and that I am happy in being able to appeal to a judgement and authority, even in his own profession, much higher than his, though I am far from meaning to undervalue his censure: I mean that of the eminent Magistrate, who presided at the late trials. The Chief Justice took more occasions than one to speak of our Society in terms of distinction and approbation, and to intimate his opinion that our proceedings furnished an example, which might be followed with innocence and safety, if not with advantage. I am fearful of overstating any thing said by the learned Judge; but I believe it is in the memory of every one who had the happiness of hearing him, that he stated it as an aggravation of the misconduct imputed to other Societies, that, in ours, they had an example of prudence and moderation, by which they might have been instructed, and ought to have been guided. But, Sir, whether we are favourites with the learned gentleman or not, we have a right to demand justice from him, and from all men. If he came to this House prepared to bring a charge of any kind against us or our proceedings, he was bound in common equity to give us notice of his intention. With all his books, and his papers, and his memorandums before him, it is not fair to expect that we should be able to answer him, upon the instant, on dates, on circumstances, and expressions, belonging to transactions which took place a year or two ago. Yet, with all these advantages on his side, and taken by surprise as I am, and having nothing to rely on but my own immediate recollection of the terms of a letter, written by us in May 1792, and signed by Lord John Russell, as Chairman, I meet the learned gentleman in direct contradiction upon his statement of that letter. I affirm, that he has misquoted our letter; that he has essentially changed the terms of it, and attributed to us a declared specific motive for declining, as we did, all future intercourse with the Society for Constitutional Information, which I am sure we did not express, and which I am confident we never thought of. He says distinctly, and more than once, that we came to that resolution, because the other Society, by their acts and proceedings,
had violated the constitution.
If they had, we ought to have gone much farther, than barely resolving to have no concern with them. I cannot recollect the exact terms of our letter, but I stand firmly and securely upon the negative. I say the learned gentleman has done that which no accuser ought to do; he imputes criminality to certain acts united to certain declarations of ours, and he changes materially the terms of those declarations. On that point I am at issue with him: he has the books before him; let him confute me if he can
The passage in the letter from the Society, dated the 12th of May, 1792, and signed by Lord John Russell, to which the Attorney General alluded, stands in the following words:
"We must beg leave at the same time to decline all future intercourse with a Society, whose views and objects, as far as we can collect them from the various resolutions and proceedings which have been published, we cannot help regarding as irreconcilable with those real interests, on which you profess to inform and enlighten the people."
. He confesses, however, that we did right in declining all intercourse with that dangerous Society; but then he says, we ought to have acted in the same manner to the Sheffield Society, who, it seems, have written a letter to the other, full of exceptionable language and matter. Agreed. I think so too; but then that letter ought to have been before us. It could be no motive of action to
us,
unless it had come by some means or other under our view, or in such a way as to oblige us to take notice of it. Now, I do assure the House, upon my honour, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, I never heard of that letter before. I hope I have said enough to vindicate our Society from the imputations, to which some gentlemen have thought us liable, and to justify the favourable opinion entertained of us, by persons of greater judgement, as well as more elevated authority. If not, I desire it may be understood that I shall hold myself ready, and forthcoming at all times, to answer any distinct charges that may be brought against us.
In this place, Sir, it may be necessary for me to observe, that neither this discussion, nor any other, that regards the principles and conduct of the different Societies, associated for the purpose of obtaining a Parliamentary Reform, is foreign from the question now before the House. The institution and proceedings of those Societies have in fact been the real or pretended cause of all the alarms, which have been so industriously excited among us, for the safety of the constitution, and of all the measures which have been taken by Government for the peace and security of the country, and among the rest, for the suspension of the Habeas Corpus act. It is no digression, therefore, to state either my own opinion and principles, or those of the Association in which I have acted, on the subject of Parliamentary Reform. But my honourable friend near me, in stating his principles and objects, has stated mine. I concur with him in every word he has said, and adopt it as my own. Sir, I know the inconvenience of particular applications of general opinions, and I shall take care to avoid it. Without referring, therefore, to this or that Parliament, I say generally, but with the deepest conviction that can be impressed on the human mind, by long observation and daily experience, that, with a House of Commons at the disposal and command of the Crown, the liberty and property of this country are not safe. Under such a combination and stewardship the liberty will go first, and the property will soon follow it. With respect to universal representation, and all the dangers and all the reproaches attached to it, I must say that I think the learned gentleman ought to be careful to distinguish those, who profess to have such a scheme in contemplation, from others who reject it with a disapprobation as full and entire, though not, perhaps, with such extravagant horror, as he does. He ought to have known that the idea of universal representation was never encouraged or countenanced by any act or declaration whatever of our Association. If he knows any thing to the contrary, I call upon him now, I challenge him, to point it out. Of
me,
in particular, he must have known, and, in candour, he ought to have acknowledged, that it is not possible for any man to go farther than I have done, to reject, to resist, and to explode every project of that nature, and every principle and argument set up to support it; a project, however, so chimerical, and so utterly impracticable, that it is superfluous to load it with charges of danger and malignity. But, let the character of such projects be what it may, there is one reflection on the conduct of Government towards the unfortunate persons who have professed them, which ought to strike every man of honour or humanity with disgust and abhorrence. While they are persecuting to destruction a number of persons, whose unenlightened sincerity deserves instruction rather than punishment, for maintaining these mischievous doctrines, observe with what guarded caution, with what profound silence, they pass by the original author, the prime mover of all these doctrines; who, if these people are deluded, is the sole cause of their delusion; who, if they have erred, is answerable for their errors; who, if they are criminal, should be punished for their crimes. Sir, I speak from positive knowledge on these points. I have conversed with several of these advocates for universal representation, and I never met with one of them, who did not quote the Duke of Richmond for his authority; who did not take his arguments from letters written and published by the noble Duke, as they said, for popular instruction. If the sense of shame were left among men, is it a thing that could be endured for a moment, that, while the men, whom his writings have deluded, are prosecuted and punished, the noble Duke himself should not only go free and unnoticed, but continue a Member of that very Cabinet, by which these prosecutions are promoted and enforced, with all the influence of Government? I will not believe it possible that his Grace can take an active share in these measures; I dismiss that thought the moment it occurs to me; such conduct would exceed the bounds of human depravity. I acquit the noble Duke of it; but still he belongs to the Administration; and whether he opposes their measures in this instance or not, is unknown to the Public. But let the doctrine I allude to be ever so mischievous, and ever so dangerous, is it in fact, is it in truth, the real object of all the apprehensions and terrors which are said to be excited by it? I do not believe it; I do not believe that the enemies of reform are so much terrified by it as they pretend to be. They know as well as I do that it is nothing but a vision, which can never be substantiated; a mere abstraction, which can never be realized. No, Sir; whatever they may pretend, this is not the true ground of their uneasiness. It is the reasonable, the moderate, the practicable plan, which really fills them with terror and anxiety. That, perhaps, might be accomplished; the other never can; nor, if it were even to obtain for a moment, could it possibly subsist; and I am convinced that, if it were possible to drive those persons to an option, they would prefer the second to the first, because they would foresee that the mischiefs inevitable in the execution of such a scheme, or even in the attempt, would determine every reasonable man in the country to revert and submit to the present system; that is, to suffer the constitution to languish and dissolve in its corruption, or gradually to perish by decay, rather than to encounter the direct and positive dangers of a change so violent and extreme, to which
their
minds would naturally unite the certainty of instant destruction.
It is now proposed to the House to renew the suspension of the
Habeas Corpus
act, with as much ease and indifference, as if the arbitrary power of imprisoning any man, for any time, without bringing him to trial, were fit to be given to the King's Ministers whenever they desired it, and continued in their hands as long as they thought fit. They do not come to us, as they ought to do, with a new case of conspiracy and treason, supported by later discoveries, by fresh evidence, and by a report of the result of both to the House. No, Sir; they content themselves with affirming that it is so, and by calling upon us to prove the contrary, if we can; that is, they shift the burden of the proof from the assertion to the negative, and conclude that the House is ready to believe that every thing they affirm is true, unless we can bring evidence to prove that it is false. These gentlemen contend, that the treasons and conspiracies of last year remain in
statu quo,
and in full force. Why, Sir, if that proposition were ever so true, they ought to prove it now, by the adduction of fresh evidence, regularly examined by another Committee of Inquiry, and by them reported to the House. Much more ought they to do so, if they pretended, which in truth they do not pretend, that they had discovered a new set of plots, and a new list of conspirators. I have never said, that a case may not exist, in which the rights of individuals, however important, ought to give way to the security of the Public. No reasonable man, no friend of his country, will deny it. What I contend for is, that when arbitrary powers are demanded, for the sake of the common safety, the case that justifies the demand should be made out, in every instance, by its own specific evidence. Nothing of this kind has been done or attempted; the ground they take now, is the same as they took last year; the evidence they resort to, is the same they have had before them above two years, and which hitherto they have made no use of, but by prosecutions and trials, in which they have utterly failed. Every one of the conspirators, of whose guilt they pretended to be so confident last year, has either been acquitted by his country, or discharged by themselves. If they have any other criminals to produce, on the ground of the inquiries and reports made to us last year, for what reason have they neglected to use the power they had, and to secure and bring them to trial in this long interval? The evidence is the same that it was two years ago; the same documents and letters were read to us last year, and may be so again this time twelvemonth. They do not pretend to say that they have any other; they must, therefore, confess that that evidence is insufficient, or that they themselves are criminal in not having hitherto acted upon it. In demanding a renewal of power, they condemn themselves; for, if they had done their duty, while they had it, a renewal now would be unnecessary. Or are we to understand that they have left these urgent duties unperformed, on purpose to keep a pretence in reserve for continuing in their hands a power to drag any man they please from his house, from his family, from his affairs; to have his papers ransacked, to have all his private concerns exposed, and to be continued in close confinement, without trial, as long as they think proper? All this, they tell us, however, is
no punishment!
It is pure mercy intended for the security of the individual, and to prevent him from carrying his dangerous dispositions into criminal effect. This language, Sir, would be very suspicious at all times, but particularly when it comes from men, who will not allow that trial and acquittal are any satisfactory proof of innocence, and who affirm that, notwithstanding the prosecutions and verdicts which have taken place in the last year, the ground they then took is not in the smallest degree altered; that the plots and conspiracies stand exactly where they did; that these propositions are self-evident, and require nothing but to be stated and affirmed upon their authority. The distinctions they have recourse to on this subject, are indeed of a piece with the rest of their conduct. If you trust to the opinions of these gentlemen, you must conclude, as they do, that the finding of a bill by a grand jury, who have nothing before them but some selected evidence of the accuser, amounts to a strong presumption of guilt; but that the verdict of a petty jury, who hear both parties, and in whose presence the whole of the evidence on both sides is minutely canvassed, does not amount to any no, not the smallest, presumption of innocence. I shall now conclude, Sir, with submitting two plain questions to these learned gentlemen, to which I hope and expect they will give me a plain, intelligible answer, such a one as a Commoner of England, contending for his rights, though perhaps not qualified to defend them in the way in which they are attacked, by legal cunning or skilful arguments, has a right to demand from him who invades them. We have been repeatedly assured, that any hardship which the persons confined last year might have suffered, from the length of their imprisonment, was not to be imputed to the suspension of the Habeas Corpus act; because, without the suspension of that act, they would, or they might have been, confined just as long under the law as it stood. If so, I desire them to tell me what they want, or what they will gain by the suspension; or, in fact, what have they gained by suspending it at all? On their own shewing they might have confined the same persons, or any others, whom they suspected, just as long as they did, and full as long as any man ought to be imprisoned, on bare suspicion, and without trial. My second question is, for what reason, even admitting all their ground, and supposing all their suspicions to be well founded, they think it necessary to take this dangerous power at the present moment; I mean, while Parliament is sitting? Without it, they can secure any person they suspect; and if, at any given moment, they should really want a farther power, what have they do but, as they did last year, to come to this House, and pass another act of suspension in the course of a single day? In the present circumstances of the nation, I take it for granted that they have no thoughts pf proroguing Parliament; but, as long as the Legislature is assembled, it is
their
proper office and duty, which they cannot delegate safely or honestly to the Ministers of the Crown, to watch over the personal rights of the subject, while they are providing for the general safety of the community. To these questions, Sir, I demand and expect a plain, distinct, and rational answer.
THE END.